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TAKING CRITICAL TAX THEORY SERIOUSLY
LAWRENCE ZELENAK*

I. INTRODUCTION
Among the most interesting and important developments in tax
scholarship in recent years has been the growth of feminist tax policy
analysis. The basic insight of this analysis-that the tax treatment of
work, family, and children has a significant effect on the lives of
women-traces back a quarter century to Grace Blumberg's 1971
article detailing the work disincentives for married women imposed
by the federal income tax.' • Blumberg was ahead of her time,
however, and her work remained largely ignored for the rest of the
1970s. But beginning in the 1980s, and continuing into the 1990s,
increasing numbers of tax academics have followed her lead. Like
Blumberg, they have examined the feminist implications of joint
returns,2 second-earner deductions, 3 and family allowances. 4 They
also have gone beyond Blumberg to consider the effect on womenrich, poor, and middle class, married and single-of many other
5
aspects of the tax system, including the estate tax marital deduction,
the progressivity of the income tax,6 tax return preparation

• Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers,21 BuFF. L. REv. 49 (1971).
2. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997); Pamela B. Gann,

Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 5-31 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, IncomeSharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Edward J.
McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the
Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A FeministJustificationfor
the Adoption of an IndividualFiling System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197,208-19 (1988).
3. See Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's1981 Response
to the "MarriagePenalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 468 (1983).
4. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
InstitutionalChoices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001,2042-55 (1996).
5. See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10
LAW & INEQ. J. 137 (1991); Wendy C. Gerzog, The MaritalDeduction QTIP Provisions:
Illogicaland Degradingto Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995).
6. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction,86 MICH. L. REV. 465,504-18 (1987).
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standards,7 the taxation of imputed income, 8 the earned income tax
credit, 9 and the Social Security tax-benefit structure. 10

Very recently, several examples of critical race theory tax
analysis have also appeared. 1 Using methods similar to those of
feminists, critical race theorists have explored the effects on AfricanAmericans of tax rules governing wealth, homeownership, and
marriage. There also have been several articles proposing reforms in
the taxation of same-sex couples. 2 In their introduction to Taxing
America, a collection of essays on "critical" approaches to tax policy,
Karen B. Brown and Mary Louise Fellows view feminist and critical
race approaches to tax policy as part of an emerging project of
exploring how the tax system treats all "traditionally subordinated
groups."' 3 They describe the goals of their anthology as "chang[ing]
the tax discourse to include issues of disability discrimination,
economic exploitation, heterosexism, sexism, and racism," and
presenting a "perspective that emphasizes the exploitive and
approaches can
discriminatory aspects of the tax code."' 4 All these
5
analysis.'
tax
critical
of
label
the
under
be subsumed
I agree with Edward McCaffery that the interest of tax
academics in such issues is long overdue: "'The puzzle and surprise
7. See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 51-75 (1993).
8. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1589-1613, 1643-47
(1996).
9. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 995-96, 1014-20.
10. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 264,
276-88 (1989); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32
STAN. L. REV. 233 (1980); Staudt, supra note 8, at 1642-47.
11. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in
TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996); Beverly I.
Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L.
REV. 751; john a. powell, How Government Tax and Housing Policies Have Racially
SegregatedAmerica, in TAXING AMERICA, supra, at 80.
12. See Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991); David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of
Marriageand the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447,
472-76 (1996); Adam Chase, Tax Planningfor Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
359 (1995); Christopher J. Hayes, Note, Married Filing Jointly: Federal Recognition of
Same-Sex MarriagesUnder the InternalRevenue Code, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1593 (1996).
13. Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA, supra
note 11, at 1, 2.
14. Id
15. Many of the essays in Taxing America had been presented in draft form at a 1995
workshop on "critical tax theory" at the State University of New York at Buffalo. See
Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Prefaceto TAXING AMERICA, supra note 11, at vii,
viii.
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is that the tax law academy has for the most part avoided the topic of
taxation and the family, and important issues such as gender bias,...
race and class,.., and has focused on more narrow and technical
issues in business and financial taxation.' "16 Precisely because of the
importance of the endeavor, however, I am troubled that much of the
work has not been carefully done. Four problems, in particular,
weaken much of the literature.
The first problem is an overeagerness to accuse the tax laws of
hostility to women or blacks. In the case of feminist analysis, this
often results from failure to acknowledge the fundamental conflict
between the feminist goals of changing traditional gender roles and
helping those women who are already committed to traditional roles.
It is difficult-sometimes impossible-to pursue one goal without
interfering with pursuit of the other goal. Yet much feminist tax
policy analysis pays scant attention to this dilemma. This is
sometimes reflected in a readiness to accuse Congress of sexism
(conscious or unconscious) whenever it acts to pursue one feminist
goal at the expense of the other. 7
Closely related to the first problem is a failure to recognize the
diversity within feminist thought. This has sometimes led to adoption
of difference feminism'" as a guide to tax policy, without considering
the powerful critiques within feminism of difference feminism, and
without considering the likelihood that public policy founded on this
version of feminism will prove counterproductive for women. 9
A third problem (also closely related to the first) is selection
bias, both in the aspects of the tax laws chosen for study, and in the
analysis of those chosen aspects. This is especially true of critical
race theorists, who focus on Tax Code provisions arguably
disadvantageous to blacks, but pay no attention to Code provisions
16. Edward McCaffery, Statement at "Taxation and the Family" Conference at Lewis
and Clark Northwestern School of Law (Oct. 6, 1995), quoted in Rebecca S. Rudnick,
Taxation and the Family, 69 TAX NOTES 421,421 (1995).
17. A classic example is the differing views of Edward McCaffery and Nancy Staudt
on the feminist implications of Social Security benefits for housewives, discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 91-97.
18. Difference feminism has grown out of Carol Gilligan's study of differences in the
developmental psychology of girls and boys. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Its adherents
generally claim that the world views of women and men are fundamentally different, with
women oriented towards caring and connectedness with others, and men oriented towards
autonomy. A frequent implication is that women are not merely different from men, but
better. Difference feminism is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 140-202.
19. This aspect of the work of Marjorie Kornhauser and Gwen Thayer Handelman is
discussed infrain text accompanying notes 194-202.
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arguably favorable to blacks." The same problem also appears in the
feminist literature, when the possibility that a criticized provision
may have pro-feminist effects is disregarded.21
The most serious problem is the failure to think through
proposed solutions with sufficient care. The solutions are often
presented as afterthoughts, with minimal consideration of whether
the author's goal is best achieved through the tax system rather than
through non-tax legal reform (a sort of "tax myopia"),' and with
minimal consideration of whether the proposed tax solution will have
the desired effects.23 It is unfair to criticize current law for its effects
on women or blacks without showing a way to do better; more
important, mere critique without a workable solution does nothing to
better anyone's situation.24
These are only tendencies, of course, rather than features of
20. This is discussed in detail infrain text accompanying notes 203-69.
21. Examples include the disregard of the possibility that the qualified terminable
interest property ("QTIP") rules work to the advantage of widows, see infra text
accompanying notes 126-39, and the possibility that current tax return preparation
standards are consistent with a feminist ethic of care, see infra text accompanying notes
178-93.
22. Examples of this in the work of Nancy Staudt, and Beverly Moran and William
Whitford are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 73-78 (Staudt) and 255-69
(Moran and Whitford). An important exception is Alstott, supra note 4. Comparing tax
and non-tax means of achieving feminist goals is a major part of Alstott's analysis. See id.
at 2066-80.
The term "tax myopia" was coined by Paul Caron to describe a tendency among tax
professionals to view tax law as unconnected with the rest of the legal world. See Paul L.
Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers, 13
VA. TAX REV. 517,517-18 (1994).
23. Dubious proposed solutions include Nancy Staudt's plan to improve the
retirement security of homemakers, see infra text accompanying notes 38-107, and
proposals to repeal the gift and estate tax QTIP provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 108-39. Some of these plans may even backfire, leaving the intended beneficiaries
in a worse position than under current law. See infra text accompanying notes 262-69
(explaining how proposals by Moran and Whitford would harm unmarried blacks).
Similarly, the proposals based on difference feminism-Marjorie Korhauser's for
increased progressivity, see infra text accompanying notes 142-77, and Gwen Thayer
Handleman's for higher return preparation standards, see infra text accompanying notes
178-93-would not produce results consistent with the premises of difference feminism.
24. My concern here is with what might be called technical realism-that is, whether
a proposed solution, if enacted, would have the desired feminist effect. Technical realism
is essential to any serious proposal. I am less concerned with political realism-whether a
proposal has any chance of actually being enacted. Academics should feel free to pursue
good policy regardless of the current state of public opinion. Moreover, what is politically
unrealistic this year may become realistic surprisingly quickly. When, however, a feminist
tax proposal is advocated precisely because of its alleged political realism, then it
deserves to be critiqued in those terms. See infra text accompanying notes 53-60 for an
example of the alleged political advantages for women of taxing imputed income.
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every feminist tax analysis. The early feminist work of Grace
Blumberg, and the recent writings on same-sex couples by Patricia
Cain and David Chambers, are creative, balanced, and thoughtful.2
And Anne Alstott's recent article emphasizes the dilemmas posed by
conflicting feminist goals and the limitations of tax-based solutions.26
Still, most feminist and critical race tax analyses feature one or more
of these problems.
The plan of this Article is to discuss a small number of articles in
some detail to illustrate the above points. First, the Article considers
a proposal by Nancy C. Staudt to tax the imputed income of
homemakers in order to provide them with income security in
retirement.' Next, it considers arguments by Mary Louise Fellows
and Wendy C. Gerzog that the qualified terminable interest property
("QTIP") rules of the estate tax are sexist in design and effect.2
After that, it examines the claims of Marjorie Kornhauser and Gwen
Thayer Handelman that difference feminism has important
implications for the progressivity of the tax system and for tax return
preparation standards 9 The Article then considers the argument of
Beverly Moran and William Whitford that the tax laws are
systematically biased against blacks.30 Finally, the Article considers
three examples-by Blumberg, Cain, and Chambers-of critical tax
analysis carefully done.3 The conclusion suggests why the identified
problems are common in the critical tax literature, and how critical
tax analysis might be improved.
Given the sensitivity of the topic, and the critical nature of most
of my analysis, the risk of misunderstanding is high. Accordingly, it is
25. See Blumberg, supra note 1; Cain, supra note 12; Chambers, supra note 12.
26. See Alstott, supra note 4, at 2004. Alstott argues that much prior scholarship has
"overlooked important conflicts among feminist goals" and has not fully appreciated the
"institutional complexity of translating feminist goals into concrete policy prescriptions."
Id. These are also important themes in my analysis. This Article differs from Alstott's,
however, in several ways. Alstott's article is limited to feminism; it does not consider
other varieties of critical tax theory. Alstott does not, for the most part, consider
individual feminist tax articles in depth. Instead, she analyzes categories of feminist
reform proposals, including separate filing by spouses, family allowances, dependent care
credits, and Social Security reform. See id. at 2042-66. Her interest is in the substance of
the proposals, rather than in the literature per se. Thus, she does not, for example,
convey or remark on the air of grievance that runs through most of the literature. Finally,
except for Social Security reform, there is no overlap between the reform proposals
discussed by Alstott and the proposals of the articles considered here.
27. See infratext accompanying notes 38-107.
28. See infratext accompanying notes 108-39.
29. See infratext accompanying notes 140-202.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 203-69.
31. See infratext accompanying notes 270-90.
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important to offer at the outset a brief explanation of where I am
coming from. I think the basic project of feminist tax policy analysis,
as begun by Blumberg and continued by many others, is worthwhile
and important." (I am less convinced of the merits of the critical race
tax project, although it is too early to dismiss the approach.) It may
be the most exciting area in legal tax scholarship today. But the few
easy battles-against tax provisions clearly sexist in language33 or
intent 34-already have been fought and won. The problems that
remain require careful balancing of conflicting feminist goals and
careful development of legislative proposals that will actually further
those goals. What I propose is to take feminist and other critical tax
policy analysis seriously-more seriously than its proponents have
taken it in many cases.
Finally, before beginning to examine the articles in detail, a few
words about my own position on feminism. For whatever it may35 be
worth, I have been identified in print as a feminist tax scholar. I
earned this designation for arguing that the tax laws should reflect
governmental neutrality between one- and two-earner couples, and
that the present joint return system inappropriately (albeit
unintentionally) favors the one-earner model.3 6 I leave it for others
to decide whether that is sufficient to make me a liberal feminist,37 or
32. In the past few years, the work of Edward McCaffery has been especially
impressive. His work is conspicuously absent from the feminist tax literature considered
in detail in this Article because I have discussed it at length elsewhere. See Lawrence
Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1997) (reviewing
MCCAFFERY, supra note 2). Although I greatly admire McCaffery's work, at times he is
too ready to accuse Congress of hostility to women, and he does not examine proposed
solutions with the same care he devotes to his critique of existing law. See id. at 1039-40.
33. For a case striking down an explicitly sex-based tax provision, see Moritz v.
Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972), discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 98-99.
34. The child care deduction in effect at the time Blumberg wrote (former I.R.C.
§ 214 (1954)) was phased out for two-earner couples as their adjusted gross income
exceeded $6000. See Blumberg, supra note 1, at 68. Blumberg demonstrates convincingly
that this was premised on the assumption that "a married mother with a husband capable
of support will not or should not work unless her income is absolutely necessary to
provide for basic family needs." Id. at 71. By contrast, the current child care credit (at
the 20% level) and the exclusion for employer-provided dependent care assistance are
available without regard to whether the wife "needs" to work. See I.R.C. §§ 21, 129
(West Supp. 1998).
35. See Staudt, supranote 8, at 1590.
36. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339,
363-72 (1994).
37. Liberal feminism emphasizes women's autonomy and their right to equal
treatment under the law. For discussions of liberal feminism, see Patricia A. Cain,
Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REv. 803, 829-32 (1990), and Marion
Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challengingthe Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH.
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whether feminism requires calling for more than merely an end to tax
distortion of women's choices. In any event, I am comfortable with
the feminist perspectives of most of the authors discussed in this
Article; my criticism is mostly of the underexamined links between
means and ends. In the few cases where I disagree on basic
premises-most notably with unnuanced versions of difference
feminism-I will note my disagreement, but I will also accept those
premises for the sake of argument and attempt to engage the authors
on their own terms to determine what those premises imply for tax
policy.
II. THE FEMINIST CASE FOR TAXING IMPUTED INCOME
In a recent article, Nancy C. Staudt presents a feminist case for
taxing the imputed income from housework and child care performed
by women. 8 Her argument is unusual because it is not based on the
familiar point that the nontaxation of imputed income creates a bias
in favor of traditional one-earner couples.39

Staudt's goal is not to push homemakers into the paid labor
force, but to improve the lives of women who choose to devote much
of their time to unpaid domestic labor. It may seem strange that
taxing these women would be doing them a favor, but Staudt argues
taxation would help them in two ways. Taxation will serve the
symbolic function of ending the "invisibility of housework."' With
visibility will come greater societal appreciation of that work.4 In
addition, taxing housework will entitle homemakers to "access to
substantial, independent social welfare benefits in retirement" (Social
Security and Medicare), eligibility for which is keyed to a history of
taxable earned income.42 The idea of giving Social Security benefits
based on unpaid work as a homemaker is not new; the idea of a
Social Security homemaker credit has been around for many years.4 3
L. REV. 1155, 1207-19 (1991).
38. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1573-75.
39. See Blumberg, supra note 1, at 61-62; McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1001-05;
Richard Posner, ConservativeFeminism, 1989 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 191, 193.
40. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1573.
41. See id. at 1574 ("Once [housework is] formally recognized, society is likely to
value nonmarket housework activities similarly to market activities ....
"); id. at 1618
(noting that taxation of housework, with resulting social welfare benefits, "would
represent a congressional recognition of caretaking responsibilities as valuable and
productive labor").
42. Id. at 1618.
43. See Karen C. Holden, Supplemental OASI Benefits to Homemakers Through
Current Spouse Benefits, a Homemaker Credit, and Childcare Drop-Out Years, in A
CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL SECURITY:

THE CHANGING ROLES OF WOMEN AND MEN IN

1528

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

What is original in Staudt's proposal is the linkage between taxation
of imputed income and Social Security benefits.
Broadly speaking, feminism has two sometimes conflicting
goals--changing gender roles, and improving the lives of women in
traditional gender roles. Feminist tax policy analysis has focused
overwhelmingly on changing gender roles; Staudt deserves credit for
bringing the other goal-of helping women as they are-into the
discussion." As a proposal for legislative action, however, her plan
for taxing housework has major weaknesses. Her claims for the
symbolic value of taxing housework are dubious, and her analysis of
the effect of her proposal on the retirement income security of
homemakers has serious inadequacies.
"But They Have One Thing You Haven't Got-A Testimonial"45
Will having an official dollar value attached to their labor, with
resulting tax liability, really make women feel more valued and
appreciated? Staudt thinks it might: "[B]ecause it would value work
otherwise considered economically worthless, taxing women's
household labor could, on balance, empower rather than oppress
women." 46 She believes it could lead to a change in the way
homemakers are viewed by the rest of society: "Rather than
perceiving women only as nurturing caregivers providing gratuitous
services to the home out of love, duty, and custom, women would be
viewed as autonomous individuals with economic rights."'47
These are surprising claims. It is not obvious that a group widely
viewed as performing gratuitous services out of love is in need of
public relations assistance. It is even less obvious that the way to
make them feel more valued is to tax them. Exemption from
taxation is not usually considered a sign of insufficient respect. More
commonly, it is taxation that is considered insulting.48
A.

AMERICAN SOCIETY 41 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C. Holden eds., 1982).

Homemaker credits are discussed in Alstott, supra note 4, at 2063-64.
44. She shares the credit with Anne Alstott, who considers in detail how feminist tax
policy analysis should proceed in light of the frequent conflicts between the two goals.
See Alstott, supra note 4.
45. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939) (the Wizard of Oz to the Tin
Man, comparing him with philanthropists or, in the Wizard's words, "good-deed-doers").
46. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1620-21.
47. Id. at 1619.
48. When Congress decided to tax the interest income on certain debt obligations of
the states, South Carolina felt sufficiently insulted to take the case to the Supreme Court.
See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524-25 (1988) (holding that there is no
constitutional impediment to the taxation of municipal bond interest). When Congress
added employer reporting requirements to enforce the theoretical taxability of tip
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Far from being taken as a sign of respect, the taxation of
women's imputed income from homemaking is more likely to be
taken as a double insult. Unless the system for taxing imputed
income is made somehow formally gender neutral,49 many women
will be offended by an official government determination that
housework is a woman's responsibility. That offense will only be
aggravated when the official determination is accompanied by a tax
bill. The taxed women probably will feel something like the man in
Abraham Lincoln's story who was tarred and feathered and run out
of town on a rail. When asked how he liked it, he said that "if it was
not for the honor of the thing, he would much rather walk."5
Under Staudt's plan, only middle and upper class women would
be presented with a real tax bill. For low income women, the tax on
their imputed income would be offset fully by a household income
tax credit ("HITC") loosely modeled after the earned income tax
credit.5 1 Although this eliminates the financial insult of the tax, it is
hard to believe that the resulting non-tax will convey a symbolic
message of any kind.
I am aware of only one piece of evidence in support of Staudt's
position. Heidi Brennan, the Co-Executive Director of Mothers at
Home, told a House Committee in 1991 that under current law, "we
not only ignore the value and necessity of [homemaking], but we
suggest that the unpaid labor of nurturing is beneath our national
dignity. We suggest that only income, which can be taxed, is a pursuit
worthy of political and social recognition."'52 Taken out of context,
this sounds like a claim that homemakers would feel more respected
income, waiters and waitresses were greatly offended by the loss of their de facto tax
exemption. Letters to the IRS from angry waitpersons are quoted in Joel S. Newman,
Waiter, There's an IRS Agent in My Soup, 40 TAx NOTES 861 (1988). Newman
characterizes the letters as "long, handwritten, and very angry." Id. at 864. One letter
warned," 'there may be a very hot, steaming bowl of soup fall on your lap next time you
do dine,'" id. at 865 (quoting Letter from "Sad and Disappointed" to I.R.S. (Jan. 21,
1983)), and another suggested," 'Why don't you just take a gun and shoot us!,' "id. at 865
(quoting Letter from Velma Lynch to I.R.S. (Mar. 14, 1983)). These letters are indicative
of the likely response of homemakers to the imputed income tax. To a large extent,
homemakers and servers are in similar socioeconomic circumstances; in many cases, for
that matter, they are the same people. If they were outraged by a tax on cash, imagine
their reaction to a tax on imputed income.
49. Whether her proposal could or should be implemented on a formally gender
neutral basis is an important issue Staudt does not discuss. It is considered, however,
infra in text accompanying notes 98-107.
50. LINCOLN TALKS: A BIOGRAPHY IN ANECDOTE 59 (Emanuel Hertz ed., 1939).
51. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1636-40.
52. Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families: Hearings Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families,102d Cong. 77 (1991).
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if the government did them the favor of taxing their imputed income.
In fact, however, Brennan was testifying in support of a universal
young child credit, which would be available even to parents with no
cash expenditures for child care. In other words, she was making the
familiar taxpayer claim that she would feel more respected if
Congress gave her a special tax break, not if Congress did her the
honor of increasing her tax liability.
Maybe Staudt is right; maybe taxing the imputed income of
homemakers will be a way of giving them the respect they deserve.
But she does not prove it, and I am not persuaded.
The Link Between Taxing Imputed Income and Social Security
Benefits
Staudt is less concerned, however, with the purely symbolic
effects of her proposal than with the link between the proposed tax
and the receipt of Social Security benefits (and Medicare coverage)
by homemakers upon retirement. I agree with her that Social
Security coverage of homemakers is an important issue, but I
disagree with much of her analysis. She does not demonstrate that,
as a political matter, taxing imputed income is the best way to
provide increased retirement security for homemakers. Even more
important, her proposal is so sketchy on the benefits side (as
contrasted with her detailed consideration of the imputed income
tax) that it is not clear that her proposal would be an improvement
over current law, let alone over other possible reforms.
B.

1. The Politics of the Link
Under current law, an elderly person's entitlement to Social
Security depends on that person (or the person's spouse) having paid
Social Security tax on earned income. But the linkage between tax
and benefits is not a law of nature; it would be possible to provide
homemakers greater Social Security benefits without requiring them
to have paid tax on imputed income. Staudt proposes the linkage
only because of her reading of the political climate. She is concerned
about current public hostility to anything that resembles welfare, and
she believes that "[i]ncorporating the value of women's labor into the
current tax structure has the potential to transcend the current social
welfare discourse,"53 with its hostility to "proposals that award
benefits without burdens."' In that case, "Congress would treat [and
53. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1630.
54. Id.
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the public would perceive] women who perform household labor as
having earned their benefits."'5 5 The linkage is only a matter of public
perception for Staudt; she does not see the tax on housework as the
source of funding for homemaker retirement benefits. 6 Incidentally,
I do not understand why Staudt proposes subjecting imputed income
to the income tax as well as to the payroll tax. 7 Only payroll taxation

is relevant on the linkage question, and payroll taxation alone should
be sufficient for symbolic purposes.
Apart from the supposed virtue of a tax on housework as a pure
symbol of respect, Staudt's only reason for taxing housework is as a
political ploy to obtain better Social Security benefits for
homemakers. If she is wrong about the politics, then her reason for
taxing imputed income disappears. There may still be good reasons
to fight for better Social Security benefits, but not for taxing imputed
income.
I am not a political expert (neither is Staudt), but I strongly
suspect her reading of the political situation is wrong. Staudt's
proposal divides homemakers into two groups-the low income, who
pay no tax because of the HITC, and the rest, who really do pay tax
on their imputed income. As for the low income women, Congress
and the public will easily understand that the proposal gives them
retirement benefits which they have not "earned" by paying tax.
Whatever political stigma is attached to welfare will attach to their
proposed benefits. A nominal tax, fully offset by a credit, will not
help.
But middle class homemakers really will pay tax under Staudt's
proposal. Although Staudt sees them as beneficiaries of her
proposal, it is unlikely they will agree. Will women-many of whom
are in families which struggle every month to make ends meet-be
happy about paying additional tax now in exchange for the prospect
of more retirement income decades hence?58 They may not agree
with Staudt's ideas on how they should allocate their resources
55. Id. at 1631.
56. "Because taxing household income is not intended to produce additional revenue,
Congress could impose a minimal, flat tax upon household labor." Id. at 1643. Staudt
never does explain how the benefits would be funded. If she is concerned about the
politics of retirement security for homemakers, she cannot ignore the financing of her
proposal.
57. She clearly contemplates imposing both taxes on household income. See id. at
1641-43 (identifying the appropriate taxpayer for purposes of income and payroll
taxation).
58. They certainly will not be happy about paying more income tax. That is pure
burden, without even the hope of future benefit.
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between present and future consumption. And it will not help that
the tax is imposed on some theoretical concept labelled imputed
income, which they probably do not believe is really income at all.
But the biggest problem will be the distrust of Social Security shared
by most baby boomers and members of Generation X.5 9 They are
unhappy already about paying taxes into a system they think will be
broke by the time it is their turn to collect. Widespread distrust of
the system means younger earners want out of the system, not in. If
the intended beneficiaries of Staudt's plan oppose it, it is unlikely to
become law.
Staudt is noncommittal as to whether imputed income should be
subject to the same payroll and income tax rates as other income, or
merely a "minimal, flat tax."' If the tax were sufficiently minimal
and the promised benefits sufficiently great, women might support
the proposal despite their doubts about the long-term solvency of
Social Security. But in that case Congress would probably reject the
proposal. The women would not have sufficiently earned their
benefits by paying a merely nominal tax.
2. Staudt's Underdeveloped Analysis of the Benefits Side of Her
Proposal
Although Staudt views taxing housework primarily as a means to
an end-improving the retirement security of women who perform
unpaid domestic labor-her article provides only a cursory analysis
of how taxing housework would affect Social Security benefits and
Medicare coverage. She barely mentions-and makes no attempt to
compare with her proposal-the spousal benefits available under
current law.' A married woman who has paid no Social Security tax
of her own is entitled to old-age benefits equal to 50% of her

59. An ABC News survey of non-retired adults, taken in August 1995, asked, "Do
you think that by the time you retire there will be enough money in the [Social Security]
system to pay you the benefits you are entitled to, or do you think there will not be
enough money?" Almost three-quarters (73%) of respondents thought there would not
be enough money (23% thought there would be enough, and 4% had no opinion). See
ABC News Poll, Sept. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll File. The
distrust of Social Security probably would have been even greater if the survey had been
limited to younger workers.
60. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1643.
61. Staudt's most thorough discussion of current law spousal benefits is a seven line
footnote. See id. at 1597 n.105. There is also a very brief textual mention. See id. at 1598.
Finally, in a hypothetical explaining how her proposal would apply to married taxpayer
Ellen, Staudt mentions that Ellen would be entitled to spousal benefits under current law,
but she offers no description of what those benefits would be. See id. at 1646.
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husband's benefits (the "primary insurance amount," or "PIA").
Her eligibility for Social Security also makes her eligible for
Medicare hospital insurance benefits.63 If her husband has died, she64
is entitled to monthly old-age benefits equal to 100% of his PIA
(unless she remarries before reaching age sixty, in which case she will
generally be entitled to nothing). 6 A divorced homemaker may fare
less well. She will be entitled to old-age benefits based on the
earnings of her ex-husband only if they were married for at least ten
years. 66 The amount of benefits is half of her ex-husband's PIA if he
is alive, 67 but she is entitled to this amount only if she is not
remarried.' If her ex-husband has died she is entitled 69to 100% of his
PIA, but only if she has not remarried before age sixty.
These rules fall far short of treating a traditional marriage as an
equal partnership between employed husband and homemaking
wife. 70 While the couple remains married, the husband receives twice
the benefits received by the wife. Divorce before the marriage has
lasted ten years is a Social Security disaster for the wife, but has no
effect on the husband. Remarriage also can be a Social Security
disaster for the wife, but never adversely affects the husband.
Reforms have been proposed to equalize the treatment of husbands
and wives by earnings sharing, under which earnings by either spouse
during marriage would be credited half to each for purposes of
calculating Social Security benefits.7 ' Thus, the wife would be
entitled to benefits just as large, and just as vested, as the husband's.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (1994).
63. See id. § 426.
64. See id. § 402(e)(2)(A).
65. See id. § 402(e)(1), (3).
66. See id. § 416(d)(1)-(2).
67. See id. § 402(b)(2).
68. See id. § 402(b)(1)(C).
69. See id. § 402(e)(1)(A), (2)-(3).
70. The effect of these rules on homemaking wives is extensively criticized in Becker,
supra note 10, at 276-85.
71. See id. at 285-88 (describing earnings sharing proposals). Becker also suggests, as
a partial solution, that Congress authorize state courts to divide Social Security benefits
between divorcing spouses. See id. at 288. This practice currently is barred by a Supreme
Court opinion. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 587-90 (1979) (involving the
railroad retirement system, but with reasoning clearly applicable to Social Security as
well). Congress has not followed Becker's suggestion. In fact, it has clarified its intent to
the contrary. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 335(a), 97
Stat. 65,130 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 407(b) (1994)). Nevertheless, a few state courts have
held that in equitably dividing marital property upon divorce, a court can take into
account that the husband will receive greater Social Security benefits than the wife, even
though the court may not divide the benefits themselves. See In re Boyer, 538 N.W.2d
293, 293-94 (Iowa 1995); In re Brane, 908 P.2d 625, 626 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
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Even without earnings sharing, reform could move toward greater
vesting of the wife's rights.
Despite the shortcomings of current law, it is necessary to
compare the spousal benefits homemakers receive under current law
with those they would receive under Staudt's proposal, in order to
evaluate the merits of her plan. 2 It also would be worthwhile to
compare the results under her plan with the results under earnings
sharing; hers is not the only possible reform. Although Staudt briefly
describes how three hypothetical women would fare under her
proposal, she makes almost no effort to show that those results are
better than the results under current law.
a.

Wife of Middle Income Couple, Little Wage Income of Her
Own

Staudt's first hypothetical is Ellen, a married woman with two
children.73 Her (unnamed) husband earns $42,500 a year, and Ellen
has part-time work paying $7500. Staudt assumes Ellen performs
forty-seven hours per week of domestic labor, which at the minimum
wage results in $10,387 of imputed income. Thus, Ellen's total
earnings subject to Social Security tax are $17,887, or about $1490 per
month. The determination of the PIA is based on "average indexed
monthly earnings" ("AIME") over a person's earning years.
Assuming this year is representative of all years, so that Ellen's
ATME upon retirement is $1490, and assuming the rules for eligibility
year 1996 apply in calculating her benefits, Ellen's earnings
(combined actual and imputed) would entitle her to a monthly
benefit of $730.74

Staudt notes that, by contrast, under current law Ellen "would
instead be forced to rely on her husband for spousal benefits earned
through his market wages,"'75 but she makes no attempt to determine
what those benefits would be. Again assuming this year is
representative of all years, Ellen's husband's AIME is $3542, and
calculating his benefits under the 1996 rules his PIA is $1233. While
72. This assumes Staudt envisions her plan as a replacement for current spousal
benefits. Since the purpose of each is retirement security for homemakers, presumably
that is her intent. In keeping with the extreme sketchiness of her treatment of benefits,
however, she never explains how her proposal would affect current spousal benefits.
73. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1645.
74. For eligibility year 1996, the formula for computing a worker's PIA is: 90% of
the first $437 of AIME, 32% of AIME above $437 to $2635, and 15% of AIME above
$2635.
See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1); 1996 Cost of Living Increase and Other
Determinations, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,751, 54,754 (1995).
75. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1646.
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both are alive and married to each other, Ellen's monthly benefit will
be half of his-about $616. If Ellen is no longer married to her
husband, she will receive either $1233, $616, or nothing, depending
on the circumstances. Staudt's proposal has the significant advantage
to Ellen of guaranteeing she will receive benefits regardless of what
happens to her marriage. On the other hand, if Ellen thinks the most
likely outcome is that she will be a widow for ten or twenty years, she
will not want to trade her right under current law to $1233 per month
for a mere $730 under Staudt's plan. And even if Ellen does prefer
the Staudt benefits structure, she may not prefer it enough to think it
is worth the extra tax she has to pay76now. In short, the Staudt plan is
a mixed bag for someone like Ellen.
My point is not that Ellen should necessarily prefer current law;
one can argue that either way, and different Ellens will probably have
different views. My point is that it is only by doing this comparisonand similar comparisons for differently situated women-that one
can form an opinion of the merits of Staudt's proposal. Yet Staudt
herself fails to do the comparison, possibly due to a sort of tax
myopia. Coming at the issue from the perspective of a tax specialist,
she is fascinated by questions relating to the tax base. Thus, she
discusses in great detail how the amount of imputed income should8
be determined. 77 She has less interest in what rates should apply7
and almost none in how all this will affect the amount of women's
Social Security benefits. This is an understandable hierarchy of
interests for a tax academic, but it is inappropriate for a proposal
whose purpose is retirement security. Taxing imputed income is
supposed to be merely a means to an end for Staudt. But as her
title-Taxing Housework-suggests, she is more interested in the
means than in the goal.
b. Middle Income Single Mother
Staudt's second hypothetical is Deborah, a single mother, who

76. Under earnings sharing, without consideration of imputed income, Ellen and her
husband would each be credited with $2083 monthly earnings, which would produce
monthly retirement benefits of $920 for each. Ellen would certainly prefer this result to
Staudt's proposal; she might or might not prefer it to current law, depending on what she
expects her future situation to be.
77. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1618-27.
78. I return again to her comment: "Because taxing household income is not
intended to produce additional revenue, Congress could impose a minimal, fiat tax upon
household labor." Id. at 1643. I do not understand the point of all the effort to get the tax
base right, if only a nominal tax is to be applied to the base. '
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has a job paying $30,000 per year.79 Staudt calculates the value of her
household services at $8177. Because of the highly progressive
nature of the formula for calculating PIA, the increased AIME under
the Staudt plan increases Deborah's expected monthly benefits by
only $126-from $1053 to $1179. The imputed income is stacked on
top of her other income, and the other income has absorbed all of the
90% earnings replacement bracket, and most of the 32% bracket as
well. Thus, most of the imputed income generates only 15%
replacement. For this small incremental retirement benefit, Deborah
must pay substantial tax now. Staudt calculates annual payroll tax,
after HITC, of $607-a little over $50 per month.80 That tax alone
almost certainly would be sufficient to make this a bad deal for
Deborah, but there is also an income tax burden. Assuming the
$8177 is all taxed at 15%, that is an additional tax burden of $1227
per year, or $102 per month." Staudt's proposal would be a terrible
deal for Deborah.
It would be possible, of course, to tinker with the tax and benefit
formulas until they gave Deborah a reasonable benefits return on her
housework tax. There still would be, however, a fundamental
question. Unlike Ellen, Deborah is already entitled to substantial,
non-derivative Social Security benefits based on her $30,000 wages.
Why is it desirable that she should pay additional tax now to receive
additional benefits later? Staudt would have Deborah pay more tax,
and receive more Social Security, than a childless woman with
$30,000 wages." It is not clear why that would be desirable.
Certainly the existence of a child does not increase Deborah's ability
to pay tax now (quite the opposite), nor does it obviously increase
her need for retirement income later. So what is the point of
applying the housework tax to Deborah?
A similar question applies to the effect of Staudt's proposal on a
married woman with substantial wages of her own. Imagine a
79. See id. at 1646.
80. See id.
81. See id. These tax burden calculations are all subject to the caveat that Staudt also
suggests the possibility of "a minimal, flat tax upon household labor." Id. at 1643.
82. Actually, it is not clear that a childless, single woman would be excluded from
Staudt's proposal. All three hypotheticals offered by Staudt involve women with children.
However, her estimates of hours of household labor per week are not limited to labor
performed for children (or husbands); they include labor performed for the benefit of the
woman herself. See id. at 1644. Either the childless worker should be included in Staudt's
system (but with fewer hours of household work per week), or the hours of household
labor taken into account for Deborah should be only the marginal hours attributable to
work for the benefit of her child.
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husband and wife, each of whom earns $40,000 a year. Under current
law they pay equal tax and are entitled to equal retirement benefits,
not dependent on the future of the marriage. But Staudt would
subject the wife to greater tax than the husband, and eventually
would give the wife greater Social Security benefits. Again, it is not
clear why.
c. Unemployed Single Mother
Staudt's final hypothetical is Martha, an unemployed single
mother.83 She has imputed income of $9282, the tax on which is
entirely offset by the HITC. On the assumption that "as her
household labor decreases her waged labor will increase to equal
approximately $10,000 per year,"' Staudt estimates Martha will be
entitled to $520 per month in Social Security benefits. Since Martha
pays no tax, the only policy question is on the benefits side. The
question is whether we should provide some minimal level of
retirement security for unemployed single mothers when
unemployment otherwise results in no Social Security benefits."
There is certainly a plausible argument that we should because, by
spending their time raising their children, the mothers are conferring
a benefit on society.86 Even accepting that argument, however,
current law may already do enough for such mothers. In the AIME
calculation, one's five lowest (or zero) earning years are dropped
out. 7 Thus, a single mother can be unemployed for a total of five
years without suffering any Social Security detriment. In the current
mood of society, in which a five-year lifetime limit on welfare
benefits recently has become law,88 anything more than the current
five-year allowance seems politically unrealistic.
But the real problem with Staudt's analysis of Martha is that it
continues the cursory treatment of benefits, even in a situation where
benefits are the only real issue. Staudt tells us that the resulting $520
per month benefits "could ensure Martha's economic security in old

83. See id. at 1646.
84. Id. at 1646 n.315.
85. This assumes Staudt's proposal would not cover childless single women. That
question is discussed supra in note 82.
86. Of course, the Staudt plan includes no way to monitor either the quality or the
quantity of their child care labor.

87. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1994).
88. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2105,2137-38 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)
(West Supp. 1998)).
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age."89 But this analysis is lacking in two ways. First, much of the
$520 is not due to Martha's imputed income; Staudt assumes Martha
will have wage income at other stages of her life, which would entitle
her to some benefits in any event. Second, Staudt offers no analysis
of whether $520 per month is an appropriate level of benefit.
Assuming unemployed mothers deserve retirement income security,
it is unlikely that $6240 per year is enough to provide it.
C. The Pitfalls of Helping Women as They Are
Although I applaud Staudt's concern for helping women as they
are, any attempt to do so involves dangers for feminists. The basic
problem is that although it is intellectually consistent to want both to
change gender roles and to help women in traditional gender roles, in
practice many attempts to further one goal interfere with pursuit of
the other goal. Anne Alstott discusses this problem at length in her
article, and uses Social Security reform as an example.90 Here I will
briefly comment on two ways in which Staudt's article illustrates the
conflict: the likelihood that Social Security benefits for homemakers
will discourage some women from working outside the home, and the
question of whether Staudt's plan could or should be implemented in
a formally gender neutral way.
1. Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't
Although barely acknowledged by Staudt, the spousal benefits of
current law are an attempt-flawed, but much better than nothingto provide retirement security for homemakers. At least in broad
outline, they further the feminist goal of helping women as they are.
They have been strongly criticized, however, from the feminist
perspective of changing gender roles. Edward McCaffery notes that
the tax-benefit structure of current law encourages women to stay
home. Their first dollars of market earnings are taxed, but they
receive no benefit from that tax because the benefits associated with
their own earnings are less than the spousal benefits to which they
were already entitled.91 Thus, a law which achieves some good in
terms of helping women as they are, comes under criticism for
perpetuating gender role stereotypes.

89. Staudt, supra note 8, at 1647.
90. See Alstott, supranote 4, at 2059-66.

91. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 999-1000. McCaffery slightly overstates his case.
The wife derives benefit from even her first dollars of earnings, in the sense that Social
Security based on her own earnings is not at risk in case of divorce.
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It is often difficult or impossible to further one feminist goal
without impinging on the other. Like current law, Staudt's proposal
would discourage women from working outside the home because
they would derive little additional Social Security coverage from the
significant additional tax they would be required to pay. The effect
would not be as dramatic as under current law, but it would exist.

Recall the highly progressive nature of the Social Security benefits
program: the first dollars of AIME are replaced at 90%, then 32%,

and finally only 15%.

92

The wife's market earnings will be stacked on

top of her imputed income, which will have absorbed all of the 90%

bracket and much of the 32% bracket.93 She must pay the full payroll
tax rate on her market earnings, but because of the stacking effect

they will be replaced at only 32% or 15%. The same problem also
exists under earnings sharing.

The wife's half share of her own

earnings is stacked on top of her half share of her husband's earnings,
thus producing little benefit-possibly no benefit at all if her share of
earnings already puts her at the maximum benefit
her husband's
94

level. And apart from the practical disincentive effect, there is the
Any special legislative provision for
matter of symbolism.
homemakers constitutes official validation of traditional gender
roles.
No matter what Congress does in this area, it will be subject to
attack from some feminist perspective. If it does not protect
homemakers, it is valuing only the male version of work. If it does

protect homemakers, it is perpetuating sexist stereotypes.

I am not

92. See supra note 74.
93. The stacking effect would not exist to the extent the wife's labor force
participation caused a decrease in her imputed income. Staudt suggests, however, that
the decrease should be small. She cites studies indicating that a full-time homemaker
performs 50 hours of housework per week, and a woman with a full-time job performs 35
hours of housework. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1644.
94. McCaffery claims earnings sharing would not have the effect of "deterring
secondary earners from labor force participation," except in the limiting case where her
share of the husband's earnings puts the wife at the maximum benefit level. McCaffery,
supra note 2, at 1001. This ignores the stacking effect that occurs even when the wife has
not reached the maximum benefit level.
95. Nevertheless, some compromises are better than others. Probably the best
compromise on this issue is McCaffery's recent suggestion of retaining spousal Social
Security benefits, and imposing no Social Security tax on the earnings of a secondary
earner spouse until her earnings are at a level where they produce an increase in Social
Security benefits (relative to the spousal benefits to which she is already entitled). See
MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 102. Under this approach, wives would not be discouraged
from paid labor by the prospect of Social Security taxation without corresponding
benefits. Even this proposal, however, is subject to the feminist criticism that it
perpetuates the gendered division of labor by providing special protection for housewives.
I discuss the proposal in more detail in Zelenak,supra note 32, at 1044.
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suggesting feminism need be monolithic. Some people can place the
highest priority on changing gender roles, others can consider
protecting those in traditional gender roles more important, and both
can legitimately call themselves feminist. Moreover, feminists may
value both goals, recognize the inevitable conflicts between them,96
and search for the best possible compromises. All I suggest is that,
given the inevitable tradeoffs between different feminist goals,
feminists be conscious of those tradeoffs in designing their proposals,
and that they moderate the rhetoric in their criticisms of current
law. 97 Rather than being motivated by sexism, Congress may be
making a good faith effort to address a feminist dilemma.
2. The Question of Formal Sex Neutrality
Staudt contemplates an explicitly sex-based tax and benefits
system. Under her proposal, women would be subject to the
housework tax and entitled to resulting benefits; there would be no
tax on or benefit for men. I believe an explicitly sex-based system
can only be a disaster. At the symbolic level, it sends the message
that the government has determined officially that housework is a
woman's job. That message is remarkable for its capacity to offend
almost everyone. Feminists may take the message as normative-not
just that women in fact perform most housework, but that they
should have that burden. Men may take the message as descriptivethat men do not perform any housework-and be offended if the
description is not true of them.
Since the plan combines burdens and benefits, we can expect
constitutional challenges both from women who do not perform
housework and want to be excluded from the system, and from men
who perform housework and want to be included. Those challenges
probably would succeed. In the most similar decided case, Moritz v.
Commissioner,9 the Tenth Circuit ruled that former I.R.C. § 214
violated the Constitution by discriminating against men. The
provision allowed a deduction for dependent care expenses for nevermarried women, but not for never-married men. The court
96. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1000 ("There is a trade off between designing
rules for existing social arrangements and influencing the course of prospective ones.").
97. To their credit, neither Staudt nor McCaffery writes at the rhetorical level of
some feminist tax policy critics.
Even so, Staudt occasionally offers dubious
characterizations of congressional behavior-she describes Congress as "refusing to count
unpaid household labor in the calculation of retirement benefits," Staudt, supra note 8, at
1598-99 (emphasis added)-and McCaffery attributes "the basic structure of our laws" to
"a highly gendered, patriarchic world," McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1058.
98. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
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explained: "The statute did not make the challenged distinction as
part of a scheme dealing with the varying burdens of dependents'
care borne of taxpayers, but instead made a special discrimination
premised on sex alone, which cannot stand."99

The taxpayer in

Moritz was represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Most likely we
would never see a constitutional challenge to Staudt's explicitly sexbased law because the same problems that would make it
unconstitutional would prevent its enactment.
Given the continued prevalence of gendered behavior, it is often
possible to write laws in formally sex-neutral terms, which have
effects similar to sex-specific laws. The current Social Security
spousal benefits are a classic example. Either spouse is entitled to
benefits based on the earnings of the other, but the intended and
actual beneficiaries are overwhelmingly women. 100 Similarly, the
second-earner income tax deduction (10% of the earned income of
the lower-earning spouse), in effect from 1981 to 1986, was officially
sex-neutral. 10 ' But it functioned primarily as a reduction in the
burden on wives' earnings because the vast majority of lower-earning
spouses were wives."° Edward McCaffery has proposed, for feminist
reasons, "taxing married men more, possibly much more, than
married women."'0 3 Rather than explicitly tying tax rates to sex,
however, he suggests different tax schedules for the higher- and
lower-earning spouses, in order to "finesse constitutional norms.""
I am not sure whether a law could be drafted in sex-neutral
terms which would be acceptable to Staudt.1 5 With respect to single
99. Id. at 470.
100. In 1985, over 99% of the persons receiving benefits as surviving spouses were
women. See Becker, supra note 10, at 273 (citing SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SOC. SEC. BULL.: 1987 ANN. STATISTICAL SUPP. 154 tbl.70).
101. See I.R.C. § 221 (1981) (repealed 1986).
102. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 1993, the wife earned more than
the husband in only 23% of married couples. See Tamar Lewin, Women Are Becoming
Equal Providers,N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A27. However, in a 1994 survey by Louis
Harris & Associates, 48% of employed married women reported providing half or more
of their families' income. See FAMILIES AND WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW
PROVIDERS: A STUDY OF WOMEN'S VIEWS ON FAMILY, WORK, SOCIETY, AND THE

FUTURE 33 (1995).
103. Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 656 (1993).
104. Id. at 662.
105. The mere fact that a law with differential effects on men and women is written in
sex-neutral terms is not a guarantee of its constitutionality. A formally neutral law should
survive constitutional challenge, however, when that formal neutrality is not a subterfuge
for sex discrimination. Retirement income security for non-market workers is clearly a
legitimate public policy goal, even if most of the beneficiaries happen to be women.
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custodial parents, I see no reason for including a single mother in the
tax-benefits system, while excluding a single father similarly situated
in all ways but sex. But single fathers never make an appearance in
Staudt's analysis, so I do not know if she would agree. As for
married men, it certainly would be possible to identify the
houseworking spouse in some sex-neutral way, such as by comparing
the market earnings of the two spouses." 6 Again, I do not know
whether Staudt would accept that approach. She might respond with
sociological studies indicating that wives often do most of the
housework even when they are the higher-earning spouse, and so
reject the sex-neutral approach.'07
Since I do not like Staudt's proposal, in either sex-specific or sexneutral form, I am not the one to choose between the two
approaches. I do, however, have one prediction and one comment.
The prediction is that if anything resembling Staudt's proposal is ever
enacted, it will be formally sex-neutral. The comment is that Staudt's
failure even to note the clear non-viability of a sex-specific proposal,
or to discuss the possibility of a sex-neutral substitute, is another
example of her inadequate consideration of her own proposal.
HI. THE ALLEGEDLY SEXIST QTIP
As part of extensive changes to the estate and gift tax laws in
1981, Congress made two major structural changes in the taxation of
transfers between spouses. 08 First, it treated a married couple as a
taxable unit for transfer tax purposes by providing for an unlimited
marital deduction for transfers to a spouse.109 Second, it provided
that the marital deduction would be available not only for outright
There are no reported cases challenging the constitutionality of the current formally sexneutral Social Security spousal benefits on sex discrimination grounds.
106. Comparing their hours of market labor might be a more accurate sex-neutral
means of identifying the primary houseworker, but it would be much harder to do.
107. As noted earlier, I do not understand the point of including anyone with
substantial market earnings in the housework tax-benefits system, but Staudt clearly
wants to do so. See supra text accompanying note 58.
108. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172,
301-04 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
109. See I.R.C. § 2056 (West Supp. 1998) (estate tax marital deduction); id. § 2523 (gift
tax marital deduction). Before 1981, the marital deduction generally was limited to half
of a decedent's adjusted gross estate. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,

TAX ACT OF
1981, at 231 (Comm. Print 1981). The purpose of this limited deduction was roughly to
97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY

equalize the transfer tax treatment of spouses in separate property and community
property jurisdictions. See H.R. REP. No. 80-1274, at 21, 24-26 (1948), reprinted in 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184, 1188-91; S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 22, 26-29 (1948), reprinted in
1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1258, 1270, 1271-72.
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transfers to a spouse, and for transfers to trusts over which the
recipient spouse has a general power of appointment," 0 but also for
transfers to a new kind of spousal trust, the QTIP. Under the QTJP
rules, if a decedent leaves property to a trust, with income to his
surviving spouse for life and remainder to anyone chosen by the
decedent, and the decedent's executor makes a QTIP election, then
the property will not be included in the decedent's taxable estate."'
Upon the death of the surviving spouse, however, the value of the
QTIP property at the time of her death must be included in her
taxable estate.1
Similar rules apply under the gift tax for lifetime
gifts to QTIP trusts, and for lifetime dispositions of interests in QTIP
trusts."'
The QTIP rules have been criticized as sexist in articles by
Professors Wendy C. Gerzog and Mary Louise Fellows." 4 Gerzog
argues that the QTIP provisions are based on sexist stereotypes; she
claims the rules grew out of a "climate of paternalism, which is
degrading to women.""' 5 In addition, both Gerzog and Fellows argue
that these rules have caused financial injury to widows by
encouraging husbands to leave them only life estates, rather than
outright ownership of property. Gerzog says the framers of the rules
"degraded women because they assumed that widows would be
content with receiving only one of the indicia of property.""16 In
equally strong language, Fellows brands the QTIP rules as "especially
revealing of the patriarchy's subversion of married women's property
rights.""' 7 She accuses those responsible for the rules of "moral
' 8 Although the rules are formally gender neutral, Gerzog
stupidity.""
and Fellows base their criticisms on the effect of the rules in the usual
situation in which the propertied husband is the decedent and the
wife is the surviving spouse. 19
I am no great fan of the QTIP rules. It seems unreasonably
generous to exclude from a husband's estate property he owned at

110. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (West Supp. 1998) (estate tax); id. § 2523(e) (gift tax).
111. See id. § 2056(b)(7).
112. See I.R.C. § 2044 (1994).
113. See I.R.C. § 2523(f) (West Supp. 1998) (gift tax deduction for donor spouse); id.
§ 2519 (taxable gift by donee spouse who makes a lifetime disposition of an interest in a
QTIP trust).
114. See Gerzog, supranote 5; Fellows, supra note 5, at 156-59.
115. Gerzog, supra note 5, at 320.
116. Id.
117. Fellows, supra note 5, at 158.
118. Id. (borrowing the term from Adrienne Rich).
119. See Gerzog, supranote 5, at 305 n.11.
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death, and the destination of which in the next generation has been
determined by the husband. Moreover, as Gerzog points out, there is
a logical inconsistency between the basic premise of the unlimited
marital deduction, and the premise of the QTIP provisions. 2 The
unlimited marital deduction is premised on the assumption that the
two are as one; husband and wife are so much a single unit that it is
only fair to disregard transfers between them. But the only reason a
husband would use a QTIP trust, rather than an outright spousal
bequest or a general power of appointment trust, is because the
husband fears his wife will not share his views on the proper ultimate
destination of his assets. The fact that the husband has chosen a
QTIP trust disproves the assumption of spousal unity upon which the
marital deduction is based. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that the QTIP rules are sexist, in either their premises or their effects.
Gerzog and Fellows fail to prove their feminist cases against the
QTIP.
A. Sexist Premises?
Gerzog's claim that the rules rest on sexist premises is based
largely on a quotation from a 1966 article in a publication for tax
practitioners. The author of that article argued for something like
the QTIP rules because "[t]he tax law should not offer a premium to
a husband who ignores his better judgment and grants his widow a
general power of appointment leaving his children at the mercy of
any charlatan who has his widow's ear."" Gerzog sees this as the
smoking gun which proves her case that the QTIP rules originated
"admidst [a] climate of paternalism,... degrading to women."'' But
she has to go back fifteen years before the QTIP rules were enacted,
to an article by someone with no official status in the process leading
to those rules, to find the gun. It is certainly true that the QTIP is
responsive to male fears that widows will not have the same objects
of their bounty as would their deceased husbands. But the major
concern was the possibility that the widow might genuinely have a
mind of her own, not the influence of charlatans. The most obvious
setting for this concern-frequently referred to around the time of
enactment-is second marriages, in which the husband's children are
120. See id. at 318-19, 326.
121. For a detailed criticism of the QTIP rules as being based on a fiction of marital
unity, see Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 11, at 25.
122. John W. Beveridge, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Beneficent Intent,
Baneful Result, 44 TAXES 283, 284 (1966), quoted in Gerzog, supra note 5, at 320.
123. Gerzog, supra note 5, at 320.
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not the wife's. 4 The husband expects his widow will prefer her own
children (or a later husband) to his children. Perhaps the husband's
estate does not deserve a marital deduction if the husband is not
willing to trust the second wife's ultimate decision, but that is not the
question at the moment. The question is whether it is degrading to
assume the second wife may not share the husband's feelings toward
his children. And the answer, of course, is no.
But what if the husband and wife do share the same children?
The husband may fear the wife will prefer her new husband to the
couple's children, not because she has no mind of her own, but
because she has (in his view) too much mind of her own. This is not a
model of trust and unity in marriage and his estate may not deserve a
marital deduction if he is unwilling to trust her, but it is not
demeaning to women. It comes closer to being a compliment."25 In
short, the QTIP rules are based much more on the non-degrading
view that widows have minds of their own, than on the degrading
view that they are at the mercy of charlatans.
And even to the limited extent the QTIP rules are based on the
mercy-of-charlatans concern, one should not .be too quick to label
that concern sexist. It is not degrading to note that many elderly
widows may be quite unsophisticated economically-and that was
even more true in 1981 than it is today. We may not like the kind of
marriage that made them unsophisticated, but it does not follow that
the law should blind itself to social reality. A rule which assumes that
women have financial sophistication they do not have may be worse
for women than one that takes them as they are.
B. Do Widows Lose Out with QTIPs?
Gerzog and Fellows both claim that QTIPs hurt widows
economically. 26 With a QTIP, a husband planning his estate does not
have to choose between the estate tax advantages of the marital
124. See Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Estate
and Gift Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong. 349 (1981) (statement of
Malcolm A. Moore), quoted in Fellows, supra note 5, at 158; 127 CONG. REC. 17,288,
17,289 (1981) (statement of Sen. Symms), quoted in Gerzog, supra note 5, at 310.
125. Ironically, Gerzog herself makes an assumption more insulting to women than
anything implicit in the QTIP provisions. According to her, "The QTIP's requirement of
giving the surviving spouse less than full ownership reveals an intention to delude the
surviving spouse into accepting QTIP treatment as if she truly owned the property."
Gerzog, supra note 5, at 325. Gerzog apparently assumes widows are too ignorant or too
stupid to understand the difference between outright ownership and an income interest
for life.
126. See id. at 320-25; Fellows, supra note 5, at 158-59.

1546

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

deduction and the non-tax advantage of being assured of his assets'
ultimate destination. As Gerzog notes, the QTIP enables him to
have his cake and eat it too.12 7 Both Gerzog and Fellows assume that
widows would fare better in a world without QTIPs because in that
case their husbands would choose the estate tax benefits of the
marital deduction and leave their wives outright bequests.12 But if a
husband is forced to choose, he may make any choice. Contrary to
their assumption, he may decide that control over the destination of
his estate is more important than tax benefits. Instead of the outright
bequest that Gerzog and Fellows imagine, or the life estate the
husband would choose if he had the QTIP option, the widow may get
nothing. Intermediate choices are also possible. For example, the
husband might decide to leave his widow enough to buy an annuity
for life equal in value to the life estate she would have received in a
world with QTIPs. In that case, the widow's welfare would be
unaffected by the QTIP rules.
It is a difficult empirical question whether widows would fare
better with or without a QTIP provision. A complete analysis would
require study of how husbands would choose between the marital
deduction and control if they could not have both, information on the
risk aversion of widows, and consideration of the rules in each state
concerning a widow's forced share election. I am not at all sure what
the result would be, although my intuition is that widows probably
fare better with the QTIP than they would without. But Gerzog and
Fellows consider none of this. By making the unwarranted
assumption that husbands would choose the marital deduction over
control, they ignore the real possibility that QTIPs are a boon to
widows. Many widows might be sorry if this academic feminist
argument were to prevail.
Imagine a husband who would leave his wife $1 million in a
QTIP trust, if the QTIP option were available. Suppose empirical
research indicates that, in the absence of that option, it is a coin flip
whether the husband will leave his wife $1 million outright or leave
her nothing. Now suppose we ask that wife whether the QTIP
provisions are a good idea. She will be their most fervent supporter.
Given the well-known (and well-justified) risk aversion of the

127. See Gerzog, supra note 5, at 319.
128. See id. at 321. "[W]omen's interests would be better served by requiring
husbands to make outright transfers of property to their wives." Id. "Ultimately, the
QTIP in theory and practice means that wives are not considered worthy of being
property owners or of exercising their rights to make wills." Fellows, supranote 5, at 159.
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elderly,129 she certainly will prefer the guarantee of the income on $1
million for life to a 50-50 chance of $1 million outright or nothing.
Having her needs met for the rest of her life is far more important
than whether or not she is able to control the fate of the $1 million
upon her death.
The analysis is complicated by a widow's right to elect against
the will and take a forced share in the vast majority of states.130
Forced share legislation varies greatly from state to state, but
typically a widow is entitled to elect to receive between one-third and
one-half of the value of the net estate. 3 ' If such a statute exists and is
not easily avoided, and if the wife makes an election under the
statute, then she does not run the risk of complete disinheritance. In
many jurisdictions, however, forced share statutes apply only to the
husband's probate estate, so that the wife's rights under the statute
can be readily defeated by the use of will substitutes, such as
revocable trusts and life insurance. 32 Moreover, as Fellows herself
notes (in another context), a wife may be unwilling for social,
will,
psychological, or moral reasons to elect against her husband's
33
even when it would be in her financial interest to do so.
Even if the forced share is not defeated by the husband's clever
planning or the widow's own inhibitions, the widow may do less well
under it than with a QTIP. Suppose a husband has a $10 million
estate, and his wife has no wealth of her own. If the QTIP option is
available, and if his estate planning strategy is maximum deferral,TM
129. See Paul L. Menchik & Martin David, Income Distribution,Lifetime Savings, and
Bequests, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 672, 688 (1983) ("[Plersons become more and more averse

to risk as they age."). It is also commonly thought that women are more risk averse than
men. See Kerry Hannon, Why the Rules Are Different for Women, WORKING WOMAN,
Sept. 1995, at 20,78; Clint Willis, How Much Risk Should You Take, WORKING WOMAN,

Sept. 1994, at 45, 46.
130. See PAUL G.

HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION

150-64 (2d ed. 1994).
131. See id. at 151.
132. Courts in some jurisdictions have brought some kinds of will substitutes within
the scope of the forced share legislation, despite the absence of support for that approach
in the statutory language. See id. at 155. The version of the Uniform Probate Code in
effect in several states specifically exempts life insurance from the scope of the forced
share rules. See id. at 152; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1) (pre-1990 version), 8 U.L.A.
297 (1998). In virtually all jurisdictions, a widow has no forced share rights in outright
gifts made by her husband more than two years before his death. See HASKELL, supra
note 130, at 156. Thus, a husband willing to transfer the bulk of his assets to his children
while he is still alive (and reasonably healthy) can almost always defeat his wife's forced
share rights. In addition, a husband who plans far enough ahead may be able to obtain a
release of all forced share claims by premarital agreement. See id. at 161-64.
133. See Fellows, supra note 5, at 152.
134. Maximum deferral is a very popular marital estate planning strategy, despite the
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he -wIl leave $600,000 outright to his children, 135 and the remaining
$9.4 million in a QTIP. If the QTIP is not available, he will leave
nothing to his wife, and she will elect a forced share of, for example,
$3.33 million. Assuming she survives him by eleven years-the
median length of survival of husbands by widows" 5-- and assuming a
modest 5% discount rate, the present value of her life estate in $9.4
million is about $3.9 million. Despite the protection of the forced
share, she will lose more than half a million dollars if the QTIP does
not permit the husband to have his cake and eat it too. Increasing the
size of the husband's estate, the length of the widow's survival, or the
discount rate would all make the advantage of the QTIP to the widow
more dramatic.
Thus, even if the QTIP is viewed as an undeserved tax benefit to
the husband, it may redound to the benefit of widows. I do not know
for a fact that widows do better with the QTIP rules than they would
do without. But it is quite possible that the QTIP rules do widows
more good than harm. The resolution of that empirical issue is
crucial to the validity of the feminist attack on QTIPs, yet Gerzog
and Fellows simply assume QTIPs have "adverse economic
consequences for women. "137
C. QTIP Widows and a Hierarchyof Feminist Concerns
Even if the QTIP provisions were as insulting and costly to
women as Gerzog and Fellows claim, QTIP widows would be low on
the list of feminist concerns. The principal of a QTIP trust will
usually be at least $600,000 (the minimum needed to ensure that
none of the widow's unified credit is wasted), 3 ' so the primary
objects of Gerzog's and Fellows's concern are elderly women living
off of the income of $600,000 or more (often much more), plus Social
Security. This places the vast majority of QTIP widows safely within
fact that an estate equalization strategy may result in a lower combined tax burden on the
two estates. See JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 357-65
(1992).
135. So as not to waste his $600,000 transfer tax exemption. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010
(West Supp. 1998).
136. At least it was the median length in the 1960s. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX
REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 360 (1969).
137. Gerzog, supra note 5, at 327. Fellows makes the same assumption. See Fellows,
supranote 5, at 158-59.
138. The exception would be the widow of a husband with an estate of more than
$600,000 but less than $1.2 million. With an estate of $900,000, for example, the husband
might leave $600,000 to his children (tax-free under the unified credit), and $300,000 to a
QTIP trust. For the unified credit, see I.R.C. § 2010.
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the middle class, or better. I am not urging a strict intellectual triage;
if someone points out a real injustice, it is not an answer that
somewhere in the world there is a greater injustice. But in the overall
feminist scheme of things, any arguable injustice caused by QTIPs to
affluent (and overwhelmingly white) widows is simply trivial. Critical
race feminists argue that many feminists pay too much attention to
concerns peculiar to affluent white women; 139 the attack on QTIPs is
almost a parody of the kind of feminism to which the critical race
theorists object.
IV. DIFFERENCE FEMINISM AND TAX POLICY

Two feminist tax scholars have found guidance for tax policy in
difference feminism, particularly in the work of psychologist Carol
Gilligan. Marjorie Kornhauser uses this material to construct an
argument for progressive taxation,'140 and Gwen Thayer Handelman
finds guidance in establishing tax return preparation standards.' 4 ' I
find both arguments unconvincing. What follows is a description and
critique of each article, and a comment on a feature common to both.
A. Different Voices and Progressive Taxation
In The Rhetoric of the Anti-ProgressiveIncome Tax Movement:
A Typical Male Reaction, Marjorie Kornhauser constructs an
argument for a progressive income tax based on Carol Gilligan's
book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Gilligan's work describes differences in the
Development.
developmental psychology of boys (and young men) and girls (and
young women). The4 zethical development of boys centers on a
"morality of rights,"' which emphasizes the separateness and
autonomy of individuals. Under this morality, duties to others are
By contrast, girls'
only negative-duties of noninterference.
143
which emphasizes
development is founded on an "ethic of care,'
interdependence, the web of human connectedness, and
responsibility toward others. Although she has a normative vision of
139. See Crain, supra note 37, at 1191-92 (describing critical race feminism). Leading
works in this school of feminist thought include the following: BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST
THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); and Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).

140.
141.
142.
143.

See Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 470.
See Handelman, supra note 7, at 41-42.
GILLIGAN, supra note 18, at 19.
Id. at 74.
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psychologically integrated men and women, 44 Gilligan claims to be
purely descriptive with respect to children; she writes not of how
children ought to develop, but of the different ways in which boys and
girls do develop. 4 5
Kornhauser characterizes Gilligan's ethic of care as feminist,'46
and describes feminism as "less a theory than a way of knowing and
of being, experienced by a large segment [approximately 50%] of the
world's population."' 47 This is peculiar usage because it seems to
reduce feminism to a matter of one's sex. To Kornhauser, all females
are necessarily feminist, and all males are necessarily not feminist.
She is explicit on this point:
Women see themselves and the world with different eyes
and, therefore, they speak with a different voice. Women
perceive themselves, and thus the world, in terms of caring
for others, in terms of responsibility to others, in terms of
connectedness to others, whereas men perceive themselves
and the world in terms of separateness, autonomy, and
universal rules and rights. 148
It follows from the ethic of care, according to Kornhauser, that
responsibility to others extends beyond friends and relations: "We
also must maintain a minimal, less burdensome connectedness to the
nonproximate stranger.' 1 49 What does this entail? "It ...require[s]
that as my discretionary income grows, I contribute money at a
greater rate than previously to help others.... Thus, a progressive
income tax rate satisfies my obligation to myself and others. It is not
a redistribution of wealth, merely a paying of my 'just debts' to
others." 5 0

144. See id. at 151-74.
145. In a "Letter to Readers" printed as the introduction to the 1993 edition of In a
Different Voice, Gilligan emphasizes that her "work is grounded in listening," and that
when she hears her work "being cast in terms of... who is better than whom, I know that
I have lost my voice, because [that] is not my question." CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT

xiii (1993

ed.).
146. See Kornhauser, supranote 6, at 506-07.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 508. Later, Kornhauser backs off a little from this claim of universality,
acknowledging that the use of "male" and "female" voices is not determined solely by
one's chromosomes. See id. at 511. Nevertheless, "[a]s their labels imply, the female
voice is predominantly the domain of women and the male voice belongs to males." Id.
149. Id at 510.
150. Id. at 511.

1998]

CRITICAL TAX THEORY

1551

1. Kornhauser's Misreadings of Gilligan
a.

The Leap from the Particular to the General

When Kornhauser claims, "We also must maintain a ...
connectedness to the nonproximate stranger,"'' she moves from the

indicative to the imperative. She is no longer in Gilligan's world of
describing how girls and women actually are; she is in Kornhauser's

world of how "we" ought to be. Her assertion is not supported by any
citation to Gilligan-which is not surprising because In a Different
Voice offers virtually no support for the proposition that the female
ethic of care extends to the "nonproximate stranger." The girls and
women Gilligan describes see their responsibilities as being toward

those closest to them-family, friends, and lovers. Girls, in fact, tend
to avoid taking the role of the "generalized other," and resist the

"abstraction of human relationships."' 52 Instead, girls learn "the
empathy and sensitivity necessary for taking the role of 'the
particular other.' "15 If anything, it might be easier to base support
for a duty to abstract others in Gilligan's description of boys viewing
the world "impersonally through systems of logic and law."'5 4
Given the lack of empirical foundation for Kornhauser's claim, it
is not surprising that a recent study, based on opinion polling, found
no significant difference in men's and women's attitudes towards
progressive taxation.

55

Women indicated greater support than men

151. Id. at 510.
152. GILLIGAN, supranote 18, at 11.
153. Id. Eleven-year-old Amy, the most compelling subject in Gilligan's book,
explains that the ethic of care is quite diluted even with respect to casual acquaintances.
This is in response to a question about how one should choose when responsibility to self
and others conflict:
Like, I don't think your job is as important as somebody you really love, like
your husband or your parent or a very close friend. Somebody that you really
care for-or if it's just your responsibility to your job or somebody that you
barely know, then maybe you go first-but if it's somebody that you really love
and love as much or even more than you love yourself, you've got to decide what
you really love more, that person, or that thing, or yourself.
Id. at 36.
It is not clear that Amy would recognize any responsibility to a total stranger. In the
entire book, the only statement that provides any support for Kornhauser's position is
that of college student Claire: "The stranger is still another person belonging to that
group, people you are connected to by virtue of being another person." Id. at 57. Even
here, Claire seems to have in mind a proximate stranger, not an abstraction. In any event,
Claire later describes an incident in which she wrote a less-than-honest letter of
recommendation for a friend, thus favoring the friend over the unknown people who
would be adversely affected if the friend got the job. See id. at 59-60.
154. Id. at 29.
155. See William J. Turnier et al., RedistributiveJustice and Cultural Feminism,45 AM.
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for progressive taxation, but only by a statistically insignificant "very
narrow margin. 15 6 One might, of course, construct a normative
argument-feminist or otherwise-for progressive taxation, the force
of which would be unaffected by survey data of what opinions people
actually hold. If the argument were feminist, and most women did
not in fact agree with it, they could be dismissed as victims of false
consciousness. But the force of Kornhauser's argument depends on
the claim that it is based on how women really are, not on an idea of
how they ought to be. To this argument, the survey results are very
damaging.
b. The Overstated Difference
In the final chapter of In a Different Voice, "Visions of
Maturity," Gilligan goes beyond her descriptive approach to a
normative vision of fully integrated adults. 57 She explains: "In the
transition-from adolescence to adulthood, the dilemma itself is the
same for both sexes, a conflict between integrity and care. But
approached from different perspectives, the dilemma generates the
recognition of opposite truths.' 15 A young woman, who already has
a strong sense of responsibility to others, must temper that ethic of
care with a morality of rights. In particular, she must claim "the right
to include herself among the people whom she now considers it moral
not to hurt."'5 9 A young man, by contrast, must transform "the
ideological morality of adolescence into the adult ethic of taking
care."' Thus, despite the different routes they take, each finally
recognizes "two different moralities whose complementarity is the
discovery of maturity.' 161
Even after this "convergence in
judgment,"'6 differences remain.
Men are still founded in
U. L. REv. 1275, 1315 (1996). The results of another survey, however, were that
"relatively more females tended to prefer more progressive tax rates." Michael L.
Roberts & Peggy A. I-lite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness,and Compliance, 16 LAW &
POL'Y 27, 36 (1994).
156. Turnier et al., supra note 155, at 1312. The authors hypothesize that "while men
and women might speak in different voices on the micro-social level, they may not do so
on the macro [national] level." Id. at 1315. Interestingly, however, the authors "were
able to conclude with a high degree of confidence that women are more supportive than
men of redistributive social spending," although even this difference they describe as
modest. Id. at 1307.
157. See GILLIGAN, supra note 18, at 151-74.
158. Id. at 164.
159. Id. at 165.
160. Id. at 164.
161. Id. at 165.
162. Id. at 167.

1998]

CRITICAL TAX THEORY

1553

separation, women in attachment. 163 But it is now more a difference
of degree or emphasis, rather than a radical difference in kind.
To my mind, this convergence should be good news for anyone
trying to find support in Gilligan for progressive taxation. The male
capacity for abstraction brings the nonproximate stranger into one's
range of vision, and the female capacity for care suggests a
responsibility to that stranger. 164 But this is a humanist case for
progression, not a feminist one. To Kornhauser, who wants to
construct a peculiarly feminist case for progression, the convergence
is a problem.
2. The Implications of Kornhauser's Reading of Gilligan
Suppose that In a Different Voice really said what Kornhauser
takes it to say-that women, with their ethic of care, feel a sense of
responsibility to the nonproximate stranger, and men do not. What
guidance, if any, would that information provide in designing a tax
system? In particular, what would it tell us about progressive rates?
It would not tell me nearly as much as it tells Kornhauser, for several
reasons.
a.

Progressivity or Proportionality?

Kornhauser believes that everyone is entitled to the financial
preconditions for self-fulfillment-enough money not just for
survival, but also for "some level of personal safety and comfort."' 6
Obviously, the money to provide this to those who have less than
enough must come from those who have more than enough. But how
do we tell whether those with a surplus should contribute in
proportion to their surplus, or progressively? 6 6 Either kind of system
According to
could satisfy the societal duty to the needy.
Kornhauser, the tax should be progressive because "[a]s my income
grows, it is easier for me to contribute more without impinging on my

163. See id. at 167-74.

164. It also avoids the problem of explaining why men should accept a theory of
taxation based on a view of the world unique to women. That problem is discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 170-77.
165. Kornhauser, supranote 6, at 510-11.
166. To the vast majority of commentators, proportionality and progressivity have
been the only two approaches worthy of serious discussion. For a recent contrary view,
see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the
PhilosophicalBases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995)
(arguing that the only fair tax is a head tax, in which each taxpayer pays the same
absolute dollar amount, regardless of income).
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ability to reach my own goals."'67 That is her entire argument as to
why the feminist ethics of care calls for progressivity rather than
proportionality: an appeal to the declining marginal utility of money,
with interpersonal comparisons permitted. I have no problem with
the argument. At bottom, it is the case for progressivity. What it
gains from association with In a Different Voice, however, is not
apparent.
b. Where the Money Really Goes
Kornhauser's feminist case for progression is based on a
particular use of tax revenues-providing the financial opportunity
for self-fulfillment to the poor. To use an analysis premised on this
use of tax revenues as a justification for any particular tax system
design is to adopt a rather romantic view of governmental
expenditures. At most only about 40% of the expenditures to which
income tax revenue is devoted fit Kornhauser's model of the function
of government.'l 8 By contrast, almost half of the expenditures are for
national defense and interest on the national debt.169 What does the
ethic of care say about the proper tax system for raising money to pay
for a nuclear submarine or to cover the cost of federal borrowing?
Probably nothing, since it is doubtful that the ethic of care approves
of either nuclear weapons or mortgaging our children's futures,
regardless of financing methods. But in that case, the ethic of care
has nothing to tell us about how half of general federal tax revenues
should be raised.

167. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 511.
168. Excluding Social Security and Medicare (because they are not financed by
income tax revenue), total federal outlays in 1994 were $996.602 billion. See [Historical
Tables Volume] BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at
42 tbl.3.1. Of that total, $405.106 billion (40.6%) were classified as "human resources"
expenditures. See id. That category includes: education, training, employment, social
services, health, income security, and veterans benefits and services. See id. Even under
the extremely generous assumption that everything in the human resources category is
the kind of expenditure Kornhauser has in mind, that is only two-fifths of total
expenditures. It is less than the 48.7% of the budget devoted to national defense
($281.563 billion) and interest on the national debt ($202.957 billion). See id. Taking a
narrower view of the relevant redistributive spending-as expenditures on means-tested
entitlements other than Medicare-1994 federal redistribution expenses were only $88.4
billion. See id. at 95 tbl.8.1 ($170.4 billion on all means-tested entitlements), 103 tbl.8.5
($82 billion on Medicare). This is less than 10% of total federal outlays. The
entitlements included in the $88.4 billion are food stamps, AFDC, supplemental security
income, child nutrition programs, the earned income tax credit, and veterans pensions.
See id. at 95.
169. See id. at 42.
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"One Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression"'170
If Kornhauser is descriptively correct, and men and women
really do have fundamentally different beliefs as to the rightness of
progressive taxation, what is to be done? Apparently the tax system
has to have either a male (flat) or a female (progressive) rate
structure, and either way half the population will be disenfranchised.
Kornhauser does not frame the dilemma so starkly, but her answer
appears to be that the feminine approach should prevail because it is
objectively right: "The female voice not only fits reality, but is the
'
Its fit is
best interpretation of reality in that it 'fits' what we see."171
best because there really is altruism in the world, a few examples of
which Kornhauser cites.'72 But this appeal to altruism solves nothing,
for two reasons. First, she makes no attempt to quantify altruism
compared with selfishness; altruism may exist but be uncommon.
Second, she does not tell us whether these examples of altruism are
disproportionately female, or whether they are equally the work of
women and men. If disproportionately female, we are back in the
original dilemma. If equally divided between the sexes, then her
entire premise-that hers is a feminist case for progressionc.

collapses.

73

Given the obvious failure of the existence of altruism to prove
Kornhauser's case, I suspect she really thinks the ethic of care should
govern the choice of tax rate structure because she thinks the
feminine ethic of care is morally superior to the masculine ethic of
rights. In fact, she says nearly as much: "I believe the choice should
be progressivity with its vision of consideration for others and its
sense of common humanity rather than proportionality and its
narrow vision of the self-interested man."' 74 But if that is what all
women think, and if all men think the opposite, it is cultural
imperialism for either sex to impose its views on the other. How does
an ethic of care, however morally commendable it may be, justify
coercing the selfish into being altruistic? For that matter, how is
coerced altruism altruism at all? Perhaps the idea is along the lines
170. WILLIAM BLAKE, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in BLAKE: COMPLETE
WRrnNGS WITH VARIANT READINGS 148, 158 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1972).
171. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 513.
at 513-14.
172. See id.
173. Joan C. Williams persuasively argues that "[r]elational feminism," derived from
Gilligan, "is better understood as a critique of possessive individualism than as a
description of what men and women are actually like." Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender,87 MICH. L. REv. 797,813 (1989).
174. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 523.
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of Hamlet's advice to Gertrude: "Assume a virtue, if you have it
not.... For use almost can change the stamp of nature.' 1 75 By being
compelled to pay a progressive tax, selfish men will gradually become
altruistic. Unfortunately, I am unaware of any evidence that
opponents of progression become supporters after they have paid a
progressive tax long enough. And even if it were true, there would
still be the question of the ethics of this attitude modification.
Actually, there are ways out of the dilemma. If the ethics of men
call for payment of proportional taxes (at most), while the ethics of
women call for progressive taxation, then we could have separate rate
schedules-flat for men, progressive for women. Or if for some
reason that seems objectionable, we could have a flat tax for all; and
if women felt the need to do more to satisfy their responsibility of
care to the nonproximate stranger, they could voluntarily give more
to their favorite charities or to the government. 176 This is the perfect
solution. No one is coerced into paying more than he or she believes
is appropriate, but everyone is free to contribute more if he or she
feels the tax payment alone is not enough. The fact that the
payments above the flat tax rate are voluntary makes it clear that
women are choosing to care rather than responding to governmental
force. And the ability to choose the object of their generosity means
their money will not be diverted from the poor to nuclear
submarines.
This proposal, rather than coercive progressive taxation, is what
logically follows from Kornhauser's premises. A system very like this
has been championed by a group not normally thought of as
feminist-Republicans. Their advocacy of flat taxes, supplemented
by "a thousand points of light,"' 77 could have been inspired by
Kornhauser's analysis.
B.

The FeministView of Tax Return PreparationStandards
In a formal ethics opinion, the American Bar Association has
concluded that an attorney should be free to advise a client to take a

175. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4 (T.J.B. Spencer ed., Penguin
Books 1980).
176. If Kornhauser is correct that women feel a greater obligation to nonproximate
strangers than do men, one would expect that even now women would give more
generously to charities than do men. It would be difficult to research this question, both
because of the difficulty in determining the moving force in gifts by spouses, and because
of the need to control for levels of income and wealth. Kornhauser cites, and I am aware
of, no studies on this question.
177. George Bush, Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech (Aug. 18, 1988), in
N.Y. IIMES, Aug. 19, 1988, at A14.
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client-favorable undisclosed position on a tax return, even if the
position is probably wrong, as long as the client's position would have
a "realistic possibility of success" in litigation. 78 Gwen Thayer
Handelman has used In a Different Voice to argue against the ABA's

conclusion.

9

Handelman believes that a return position which

"chalienges... politically authorized judgments" (legislative, judicial,

or administrative) should be permissible only if the challenge is
disclosed on the return.8 0 However, she would permit an undisclosed

return position as 8long as the position is supported by even one
relevant authority.1'
Handelman claims that her stricter standard'82 is based on a
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985)
(emphasis omitted), reprinted in 39 TAX LAW. 631, 631 (1986). The practical constraints
on aggressive return preparation come not from the ABA, but from the preparer penalty
of I.R.C. § 6694, and from the Treasury Department's Circular 230 (governing practice
before the IRS). However, the standards of the preparer penalty closely resemble the
ABA Opinion. The statute imposes a $250 penalty on the preparer of a return which
includes an undisclosed position "for which there was not a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits." I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998). The regulations state
that a position must have "approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits" to satisfy the realistic possibility standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.66942(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). In addition to the $250 penalty of I.R.C. § 6694(a), I.R.C.
§ 6694(b) imposes a $1000 penalty for a return position which constitutes "reckless or
intentional disregard of rules or regulations." I.R.C. § 6694(b) (West Supp. 1998). As
interpreted by the regulations, this is not as similar to Handelman's position, see infra text
accompanying notes 180-81, as it may appear. "Rules or regulations" is defined rather
narrowly as the Internal Revenue Code itself, Treasury regulations, and revenue rulings
and notices. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(f) (1991). Court opinions and committee reports,
for example, do not count. Moreover, a position contrary to a revenue ruling or notice is
not subject to the penalty, even if undisclosed, if the position satisfies the realistic
possibility standard. See id. § 1.6694-3(c)(3). Thus, the regulation applies the Handelman
approach only to the disregard of the statute itself and of regulations. (A position
contrary to a regulation is not subject to the penalty if it is adequately disclosed and
"represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation." Id. § 1.6694-3(c)(2).)
The realistic possibility standard of the preparer penalty is adopted by Treasury
Department Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1997). A willful, reckless, or grossly
incompetent violation of § 10.34 can result in disbarment or suspension from practice
before the IRS. See id. § 10.52.
179. See Handelman, supra note 7, at 47-49 (summarizing In a Different Voice).
Handeiman also relies on DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND:
WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (describing different conversational styles
and assumptions of men and women), but Gilligan's work is more central to her critique
of the ABA's position.
180. Handelman, supra note 7, at 64.
181. See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 77,103-04 (1989).
182. Actually, it will not always be true that Handelman's standard is more demanding
than the ABA's. If the only relevant authority is a revenue ruling adverse to the
taxpayer's position, and the attorney believes the taxpayer's position would have a
realistic possibility of success in litigation, then Handelman's assumption-that hers is the
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conception of "civic obligation" which "quite obviously reflect[s] an
orientation toward connection and an ethic of care and
responsibility."'"m It grows out of "a complex of values derived from
a social orientation associated with women, but ... is problematic
In
under a [male-oriented] morality premised on autonomy."'"
much the same way that Kornhauser derives tax rates from Gilligan's
work, Handelman derives return preparation standards.8 5
One certainly does not.need to invoke a feminine ethic of care in
order to criticize the ABA position on return preparation. The
problem with the ABA position is that it is based on a litigation
model, which return preparation does not fit. In litigation an
attorney may advocate a position, even though she thinks it is
probably wrong, because there is another attorney arguing against
the position and a judge to decide who is right."8 6 But in return
preparation, most of the time the return will never be audited, and
even if it is audited the revenue agent may not notice the dubious
position (especially if it is a failure to include an item in income).,8"
Only if the dubious position is disclosed on the return-in effect, a
"please audit me" message to the IRS-does return preparation fit
the litigation model. That is the core of the argument against the
ABA position, and Handelman herself makes it quite eloquently.188
One can agree with that critique-as I do-without ever having
heard of different voices. Congress itself has expressed limited
agreement with the critique, by penalizing return preparers who take

stricter standard-is correct. Under the ABA Opinion, an undisclosed taxpayerfavorable return position would be proper; under Handelman's approach it would not.
But suppose there are numerous authorities on point. The IRS position is supported by
regulations, by legislative history, by the Tax Court, and by the five Federal Courts of
Appeals that have considered the issue. The only support for the taxpayer's position is a
poorly reasoned opinion from the United States District Court for the District of North
Dakota (not the taxpayer's district). Handelman would permit an undisclosed taxpayerfavorable return position; the ABA Opinion probably would not.
183. Handelman, supra note 7, at 56.
184. Id.
185. Despite the similarity of their approaches, Handelman does not cite Kornhauser's
article.
186. The classic statement of this position is Samuel Johnson's response to Boswell's
question about how a lawyer can ethically support a cause which he knows to be bad:
"'Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad till the judge determines it.'" JAMES
BOSNWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 153 (London, Spottiswoode 1859).
187. In 1995, 1.67% of all individual income tax returns were audited. See IRS
Auditing More Poor People, Fewer Rich People, GAO Says, 71 TAX NOTES 1212, 1212
(1996). It is probable, however, that the odds of being audited are higher for the more
complicated returns as to which attorneys give advice.
188. See Handelman, supra note 7, at 62.
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undisclosed positions contrary to regulations.8 9 The legislative
history of this penalty makes no mention of Carol Gilligan. 190
Of course, the ethic of care might supply additional support for
the critique of the ABA position. But as a matter of practical
politics-and Handelman gives every indication of wanting her
critique to produce results-invoking difference feminism runs a
major risk of being counterproductive. If her preferred rules are
peculiarly feminist, then her opponents can reasonably ask why
feminist values should be imposed on male attorneys with their own
ethic of autonomy. The only plausible answer is that the ethic of care
is better than the ethic of autonomy-and by extension women are
better than men. Whatever the merits of that position, it is not a
recipe for success in the legislative arena. It is questionable strategy
to invoke female superiority to support a position which can be
powerfully advocated on gender-free terms.
Finally, Handelman's argument is not even a persuasive reading
of In a Different Voice. The lawyer assisting in return preparation
has two objects of care, with competing interests-the lawyer's client
and the fisc. Handelman's reading of Gilligan is that the ethic of care
requires special solicitude for the fisc; the lawyer's responsibility to
care for her client escapes Handelman's attention completely. Yet
Gilligan's work indicates that the ethic of care applies
overwhelmingly to concrete individuals with whom a woman has a
personal relationship, not to remote abstractions. 191 If anything, In a
Different Voice supports the ABA position, which favors the interest
of the particular client over the generalized needs of the fisc.192
Handelman's reliance on In a Different Voice thus backfires in
two ways: politically it creates a battle of the sexes where none need
exist, and analytically it ignores a lawyer's ethic of care towards her
own client.' 9 '
189. See I.R.C. § 6694(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (as interpreted by Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-3(c)(2) (1991)).
190. The relevant void is in H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1394-1401 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906,2864-71.
191. This is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 151-54.
192. In this respect it resembles the analysis (not from a feminist perspective) in
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE. LJ. 1060 (1976).
193. In another part of her article, Handelman describes a feminist method of
interpreting tax legislation. See Handelman, supra note 7, at 64-75. I find aspects of her
approach attractive, but as with Kornhauser's title reference to typical male reactions, I
am surprised and offended by her gratuitous anti-male rhetoric. She contends that men
may find it "extremely emotionally difficult" to "[a]dmit that they are not in possession of
important information and attend to another who is," to empathize, and to acknowledge
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C. The Dangersof Difference Feminism
Both Kornhauser and Handelman accept Gilligan's work as
something close to gospel. Yet the tentative nature of her work is
apparent from simply reading In a Different Voice; Gilligan draws her
conclusions about differences between males and females from
interviews with thirty-two study participants, only four of whom are
male. 9 4 In fact, Gilligan's methodology and conclusions have been
the subject of numerous serious critiques,9 5 none of which either
Kornhauser or Handelman considers.
Assuming Gilligan is right as a matter of description, there is a
debate raging among feminists as to the normative implications of
that difference. Some follow the Kornhauser and Handelman
approach of celebrating the female ethic of care, and implicitly or
explicitly viewing it as superior.'96 But others view the different voice

as the result of the oppression of women, and see celebrating that
voice as. playing into the hands of the oppressor. According to
Catharine MacKinnon, "[w]hen difference means dominance as it
does with gender, for women to affirm differences is to affirm the
qualities and characteristics of powerlessness."' 7 The classic
example of the dangers of difference feminism is EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.'98 The EEOC sued Sears for sex discrimination,
based on the underrepresentation of women in highly-paid
commission sales positions 99 Sears succeeded in arguing that the
ethic of care made women uninterested in the high-pressure
that their autonomy is not absolute. Id. at 69-70. She concedes, however, that "men are
not entirely incapable of attentiveness to others and empathic understanding if not
demanded in a context that requires that they assume a one-down position." Id. at 72.
Imagine the response to a comment in a law review article that "women are not entirely
incapable of logical thought, if placed in a supportive and non-threatening environment."
194. See GILLIGAN, supra note 18, at 181 (index of study participants).
195. Some are cited in Williams, supra note 173, at 840 n.181. All of the critiques cited
by Williams predate the articles of both Kornhauser and Handelman. A more recent
critique is Lawrence J. Walker, Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning:
A Critical Review, in AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 157, 164-76 (Mary Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993) (reporting no difference in
male and female moral reasoning through adolescence, and no significant post-adolescent
difference after adjustment for differences in educational attainment).
196. For one example among many, see Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts
on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 849
(arguing for the superiority of the female perspective on tort law).
197. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 51
(1989).
198. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Il1. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Sears is
discussed at length in Williams, supra note 173, at 813-21.
199. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1270-71.
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competitive world of commission sales 0 As Joan C. Williams
observes, "[r]elational feminists delude themselves if they think they
can rehabilitate domesticity's compliments without its insults. To
relational feminists, the key point of domesticity [the ethic of care]
may be women's higher morality; to Sears managers, it was that
women are weak and dependent, delicate and passive."201
A feminist who is interested in equal rights for women 2° would
do well to stay far away from Gilligan's work; it has more potential
for harm than for good.
V. CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

In A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,20 3 Beverly I.
Moran and William Whitford investigate "whether the Internal
Revenue Code systematically favors whites over blacks." 2' They
consider their study a test of the claim of critical race theory that
"racial subordination is everywhere" in American society.2 5 To
perform the test, they adopt the hypothesis that "deviations from the
ideal of a comprehensive income tax systematically favor whites over
blacks, 2 6 and select four aspects of the Code for analysis!' The
four aspects are: various benefits granted to owners of wealth,
including the exclusion of gifts from income, the failure to tax
unrealized appreciation, and the reduced rate for capital gains; the
tax benefits for homeownership, including the interest and property
tax deductions;2 8 tax-favored employee benefits, especially
retirement savings; and the marriage penalty imposed by joint returns
on many two-earner couples.20 9
200. See id. at 1308-10, 1352-53.
201. Williams, supra note 173, at 816.
202. As I believe Kornhauser and Handelman are. That certainly appears to be
Kornhauser's position in her later work on the tax treatment of marriage. See
Kornhauser, supranote 2. For example, she writes disparagingly of the control of income
by the earner spouse (the husband in a "traditional" marriage) "[b]ehind the facade of
sharing." Id. at 91. She also criticizes the joint return system for "discourag[ing] some
women from working outside the home who might otherwise do so for economic and
social reasons." Id. at 108.
203. Moran & Whitford, supra note 11.
204. Id. at 751.
205. Id. at 751-52.

206. Id. at 753.
207. See id. at 755 (providing a brief summary of the four aspects).
208. A similar-but less developed-racial critique of the tax benefits of
homeownership appears in powell, supra note 11, at 80, 92-95. The reference to tax in
powell's title is rather misleading; the discussion of tax benefits occupies less than three
pages of a 30-page article.
209. A similar race-based critique of the income tax treatment of married couples
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According to Moran and Whitford, all four aspects of the Code
work to the detriment of blacks. They apply the same basic analysis
to each of the first three aspects. The Code provides tax benefits for
the ownership of certain kinds of assets, and blacks are less likely
than whites to own such assets. This is not merely a matter of the tax
benefits being skewed toward higher-income taxpayers. Even
controlling for income, blacks own fewer assets in general, and fewer
tax-favored assets in particular, than whites. 21 Their analysis of the
fourth aspect-the marriage penalty-is different. When persons
with roughly equal incomes marry, they suffer a marriage penalty;
their tax liability increases. When persons with very unequal incomes
marry, they enjoy a marriage bonus; their tax liability goes down.
Since black spouses tend to have more equal incomes than white
spouses, black married couples are disproportionately victims of the
marriage penalty.'
Throughout the article, Moran and Whitford offer statistical data
on black-white differences in income and asset ownership. Some of
the data come from the existing social science literature; but where
previous studies are inadequate for their purposes, Moran and
Whitford perform their own data analysis. The information they
provide is consistently interesting and well-presented.
Because they have not tested the hypothesis of pervasive racial
subordination against the entire Internal Revenue Code, Moran and
Whitford refrain from claiming that the Code "as a whole
subordinates black economic interests. ' 2 12 They do, however, think
that the results of their sample of four aspects of the
Code indicate
21 13
whites.
of
favor
in
skewed
likely
is
Code
"the entire
As explained below, their analysis is unconvincing. First, it
depends on the unexamined assumption that a comprehensive
income tax is a neutral baseline. Second, the Code provisions
sampled are not randomly selected. By considering other provisions,
one can just as plausibly argue the Code is skewed against whites. In
one case (the tax treatment of marriage), it is even possible to argue
that a provision considered by Moran and Whitford is really antiwhite. Finally, many of the solutions proposed for the supposed antiblack effects of the Code would be more harmful to blacks than
current law.
appears in Brown, supra note 11, at 45.
210. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 11, at 757.
211. See id. at 797-98.
212. Id at 800.
213. Id. at 801.
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A. An Arbitrary Choice of Baseline
1. The Income Tax and Consumption Tax Ideals

Except for the marriage penalty, all the tax provisions
investigated by Moran and Whitford are "tax benefits." They define

a tax benefit as "any opportunity for deductions or exclusions from
income that deviate from the ideal of a comprehensive income tax
base." '14 If a deviation from that ideal disproportionately favors
whites, that is evidence in favor of the critical race theory hypothesis.
The entire analysis depends on the validity of their assumption that a

comprehensive income tax base is the appropriate race-neutral
standard. For the Code to be skewed in favor of whites, it must be

skewed relative to some standard. That standard, according to
Moran and Whitford, is a comprehensive income tax 15 They make
no attempt to justify their choice of baseline, except to quote the
Supreme Court's reference in Glenshaw Glass to "'accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete

dominion.' ""6 But Glenshaw Glass does not describe what Moran
and Whitford mean by a comprehensive income tax, 217 and even if it
did, they offer no explanation of why a decades-old Supreme Court
opinion has the authority to define the race-neutral baseline for tax
analysis.
Unmentioned by Moran and Whitford, there is an ongoing
debate-academic and political-between those who believe income
is the appropriate tax base, and those who believe the tax base should
be consumption.2 " Under a cash-flow consumption tax, saved
214. Id. at 753.
215. See id.
216. Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,431 (1955)).
217. The nontaxation of unrealized appreciation is the first departure from a
comprehensive income tax considered by Moran and Whitford, see id. at 759-60, yet
Glenshaw Glass describes income as that which is "clearly realized," Glenshaw Glass, 348
U.S. at 431.
218. A few highlights from the extensive literature include the following: William D.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113 (1974) (offering the first detailed case for a consumption tax in the legal literature);
Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992)
(defending income tax); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) (advocating a progressive consumption tax without an
estate tax); and Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975) (responding to Andrews and
defending the income tax). There have been several recent legislative proposals to
replace the income tax with a consumption tax. The most prominent are: Freedom and
Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060 and S. 1050, 104th Cong. (following the yield
exemption model, sponsored by Rep. Armey and Sens. Shelby, Craig, and Helms); and
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income is not taxed until it is consumed. Results equivalent to cashflow tax treatment can be obtained by the yield-exemption method:
taxing earned income even if it is saved, but then taxing neither the
income from the investment nor the conversion of the investment to
consumption 1 9 Most of the deviations from a comprehensive
income tax criticized by Moran and Whitford are consistent with one
or the other of these two methods of implementing a consumption
tax. Tax deferral for unrealized appreciation and retirement savings,
for example, is consistent with a cash-flow consumption tax. The
reduced rate on capital gains, and the permanent forgiveness of tax
on unrealized appreciation held at death, are moves in the direction
of the yield-exemption method. Because of these consumption tax
features, the current "income tax" is really a hybrid incomeconsumption tax. By one estimate, actual law is roughly equipoised
between a comprehensive income tax and a consumption tax. 2 0
Proponents of a consumption tax argue that it is fairer than an
income tax for two reasons. First, they claim that savings serve the
public good and so should remain untaxed until converted to private
consumption. 2 ' Second, they argue that a consumption tax imposes
equivalent tax burdens on current consumption and deferred
consumption, whereas an income tax unfairly imposes a heavier
burden on those who save for future consumption. z2 Income tax
adherents have responses, of course. The most important response is
simple: "[T]ax burdens should be distributed in accordance with
ability to pay, and ... saved income creates ability to pay to the same
extent as consumed income."' In addition to the arguments for the
normativity of each polar tax model, in recent years defenses of the
USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (following the cash flow model, sponsored by
Sens. Nunn, Kerrey, and Domenici).
219. See DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsIC TAx REFORM 110-11
(2d ed. 1984) (explaining that a consumption tax can be implemented either by allowing a
deduction for savings and taxing dissavings ("qualified accounts treatment"), or by
allowing no deduction for savings but imposing no tax on investment income or on the
conversion of the investment to consumption ("tax prepayment approach")).
220. See Don Fullerton, The Consumption Tax: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 27
TAX NOTES 435, 438 (1985), cited in Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid
Income-Consutmption Tax, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1145, 1153 (1992).
221. This argument traces back to THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 238-39 (Richard
Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651). A leading modem statement of the
argument is in Andrews, supra note 218, at 1164-67.
222. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 305-06 (7th ed.
1994) (providing a simple numerical illustration); McCaffery, supra note 220, at 1185.
223. Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income Taxes, Consumption
Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (citing various statements of the
position).
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normativity of something resembling the actual hybrid system have
appeared.224
Given these different views of the ideal tax system, it is not
enough simply to assume an income tax ideal and label as suspect any
tax provision which departs from that ideal. Instead, the first steps in
the analysis should be the choice of baseline and a defense of that
choice. Consider how Moran and Whitford's analysis would change
if the suspect provisions of current law were those that departed from
a consumption tax ideal. Tax deferral for retirement savings and
unrealized appreciation would not be suspect provisions, but
provisions that taxed investment income would be suspect. Key
suspect provisions would include the taxation of interest, dividends,
rents, and capital gains.
If these forms of income are realized
disproportionately by whites-as they almost certainly are-then
starting from a consumption tax ideal, Moran and Whitford would
have to conclude the Code is systematically biased against whites.
Without an explanation of why a comprehensive income tax is
the appropriate starting point, the consumption tax argument that the
Code is anti-white is just as persuasive as the income tax argument
that the Code is anti-black. I suspect Moran and Whitford chose the
income tax starting point because the existing income-consumption
tax hybrid is called an income tax. But it is hard to believe that the
choice of labels determines whether the Code discriminates against
blacks. If it does, Moran and Whitford should be satisfied by
renaming our income tax (with consumption tax features) a
consumption tax (with income tax features).
My view is that it makes no sense to search the Code for hidden
racial bias from either starting point. The arguments between income
tax and consumption tax proponents are close to a standoff, both
intellectually and politically. Given that standoff, there is no reason
to privilege either extreme position as the proper starting point in a
search for hidden discrimination. Without a good reason to start
from either extreme, there is no reason to accuse the actual hybrid
tax of discrimination against any race.

224. See MeCaffery, supra note 220, at 1147 (beginning the project of "a principled
mapping of the central relations between the normative ideals implicit in the incomeconsumption hybrid and practical tax policy issues"); Zelenak, supra note 223, at 11
(noting there may be normative reasons for taxing some kinds of savings under the
income tax model and other types of savings under the consumption tax model).
225. Starting from an income tax ideal, the suspect feature of capital gains taxation is
that capital gains are taxed at a reduced rate. Starting from a consumption tax ideal, the
suspect feature is that they are taxed at all.
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Moran and Whitford's unexamined reliance on the
comprehensive income tax as the neutral standard puts them at odds
with other critical tax scholars. In their introduction to Taxing
America-which serves as a sort of statement of principles for the
critical tax movement-Brown and Fellows complain that traditional
tax scholars have relied on a fiction of tax objectivity, which "allows
the participants in tax discourse to claim a position of innocence and
avoid accountability for the role the tax law may play in perpetuating
social injustices. ''12 6 How do traditional scholars claim this fictional
objectivity? "Tax objectivity is achieved by relying on the ideal
[comprehensive]

analysis."

income tax base ...

as a starting point for

7

2. A Normative Hybrid Tax
Suppose a society were trying to design from scratch the best
possible tax system. Even if the society agreed with Moran and
Whitford that a comprehensive income tax should be the starting
point in the design process, almost certainly the final design would
include some consumption tax features. For example, unrealized
appreciation might escape tax based on concerns about liquidity and
difficulty of valuation. And retirement savings might merit deferral
out of concern that applying comprehensive income tax treatment
would create an inappropriate tax bias against saving for the golden
years.m By hypothesis, the goal is to create the best possible real
world tax system, so the resulting hybrid would be normative. While
I am not prepared to defend every aspect of the existing Internal
Revenue Code, I agree with Edward McCaffery that there is no
reason to assume the ideal tax system is to be found at either the
income pole or the consumption pole2 9
This makes it even more difficult to perform Moran and
Whitford's exercise of identifying deviations from the norm and
examining those deviations for racial effects.
Even with a
comprehensive income tax as a starting point, the mere fact that a
226. Brown & Fellows, supra note 13, at 6.
227. Id.

228. See McCaffery, supra note 220, at 1185 ("[P]erhaps the easiest and strongest
argument for favoring life cycle savings is that the income tax distorts the choice of
present versus deferred consumption by double-taxing the latter.").
229. See id. at 1148 ("[B]ecause of the different values we place on different types of
savings, some form of a hybrid may in fact be ideal and not merely a practical
necessity."). I would go beyond McCaffery in one respect-part of designing an ideal tax
system for the real world is designing a system that works, so rules dictated by practical
necessity are a part of the normative tax structure.
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particular provision deviates from the starting point does not
establish that it deviates from the norm. For any provision studied by
Moran and Whitford, there are two possibilities. Either the provision
is normative, or it is not. If the provision is right, it makes no sense to
examine it for racial bias relative to some alternative wrong
approach. If the provision is wrong, it should be repealed regardless
of its racial effects.
The cold logic of those two possibilities indicates there is never a
reason to examine a provision for racial effects. Actually, I would
not go that far. One may have strong arguments that a provision of
the tax laws is wrong, yet find that those arguments are insufficient to
overcome legislative inertia. In that case, evidence of disparate racial
effects may make a crucial political difference. "This provision is
wrong, and its effects are biased against blacks" may succeed with
Congress when a simple "This provision is wrong" would not. Such
an argument could be made with respect to several of the provisions
Moran and Whitford consider-such as the failure to tax unrealized
appreciation on publicly traded securities, and the marriage penalty
of joint returns. Moran and Whitford lay the groundwork for such an
argument, but they do not complete it; they do not demonstrate that
the provisions are wrong.
B. Sampling Bias
1. Nonrandom Choice of Provisions
Moran and Whitford present their study as a quasi-scientific test
of the critical race theory hypothesis of universal racial
subordinationmo Although the test samples only a few Code
provisions, they believe the results-of racial subordination in every
Code aspect studied-are striking enough to support a tentative
conclusion: "The entire Code is likely skewed in the favor of
whites. ' ' "l That inference is not justified if the provisions studied
were not randomly selected. There is nothing in the article, however,
to suggest the selection was random. To the contrary, at two points
Moran and Whitford mention tax benefits (the earned income tax
credit z2 and head-of-household filing status233), which may benefit
230. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 799 ("We have tested this hypothesis
against the Internal Revenue Code.").
231. Id at 801.
232. See iU at 754.
233. See id. at 793 n.148. I do not understand why they think head-of-household filing
status disproportionately benefits blacks. For it to be a benefit, it must be a departure
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blacks more than whites, and then announce their study will not
consider those provisions. Setting aside provisions likely to work
against the hypothesis is not an application of the scientific method.
They admit the possibility that "[flurther study of other
provisions may discover some which favor blacks over whites."''
It
is not hard to think of provisions which appear to be pro-black, by
the standards of their analysis. The earned income tax credit,235
which they mention in passing, is one obvious candidate. This is a
massive subsidy-almost $27 billion in 1997236-- for the working poor.
It seems likely the benefits go disproportionately to blacks. Moran
and Whitford claim they "have studied some of the most significant
tax benefits applicable to the individual income tax,"' 2 7 yet they do
not study a $27 billion tax benefit, which they are aware may be problack by their standards.
Other likely candidates for pro-black provisions, which Moran
and Whitford do not mention, come readily to mind. The exclusion
from income of welfare-type benefits probably disproportionately
favors blacks.3" The very existence of the wealth transfer taxes
(estate, gift, and generation-skipping) disproportionately burdens
whites, since whites transfer a disproportionate share of total
wealth.239 Even more significant is the disproportionate burden
placed on whites by progressive marginal tax rates.240 Progressive
marginal rates mean that whites, with their higher average income
than blacks, must pay a share of the total tax burden that is greater
than their share of total income. This is a massive anti-white aspect
of the Code. Similarly, whites are disadvantaged by the phasing out
from some neutral baseline, and they offer no suggestion of what that neutral baseline
might be. The key point, however, is that when they identify a provision they believe may
be pro-black, they do not-include it in their study.
234. Id. at 800.
235. See I.R.C. § 32 (West Supp. 1998).
236. See Tax Expenditures Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1998 Budget, 74 TAX
NOTES 915, 920 (1997) (noting that the refundable credit reduces tax revenues by $5.653
billion and costs $21.163 billion in outlays).
237. Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 800-01.
238. No specific provision in the Code authorizes this exclusion, but it is the longstanding administrative practice. See BoRIS I. BrrKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 9-1 (1995).

239. Moran and Whitford state that the federal transfer taxes are beyond the scope of
their article. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 783. It is unduly narrow, however,
to consider the exclusion of gratuitous transfers under the income tax without considering
that gratuitous transfers are subject to a separate federal tax.
240. The explicit provision of progressive marginal rates is at I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West
Supp. 1998). In addition, the standard deduction and personal exemptions function as a
zero tax rate on the lowest income levels. See I.R.C. §§ 63(c), 151 (West Supp. 1998).
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of personal exemptions 4 1 and of itemized deductions. 22 These
provisions function as hidden marginal rate increases on high income
taxpayers.
There are two sides to the coin of progressive marginal rates.
On the income side, progressive rates burden high income taxpayers
(who are disproportionately white).
On the deduction side,
progressive rates mean that a deduction of any given dollar amount is
more valuable to a high income taxpayer than to a low income
taxpayer. Moran and Whitford claim that the use of deductions in a
progressive rate system-their particular interest is the home
mortgage interest and property tax deductions-is unfair to blacks. 43
To remedy this injustice, they call for conversion of the deductions to
credits. 2 4 They make the deduction-side argument that progressive
rates are anti-black, but do not mention the income-side argument
that progressive rates are anti-white.
An alert reader may have noticed a weakness in the racial
analysis of progressive rates. In the same way Moran and Whitford
choose a comprehensive income tax as a neutral baseline without
justifying that choice, the arguments about the racial effects of
progressivity implicitly adopt a flat tax (or a flat credit) as the neutral
baseline without justification. Although the neutrality of a flat tax is
often assumed by tax analysts, the assumption cannot survive careful
analysis. Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith have critiqued that
assumption to devastating effect.24 They note that a flat tax may
appear to be a principled compromise "between the perceived
efficiency costs of a progressive tax and the perceived inequities of a
lump sum tax."24 6 The problem is that this "does not explain what
conceptions of fairness and justice are strong enough to rule out a
regressive tax but not strong enough to justify a progressive tax. It
would appear mere chance that the opposing goals of efficiency and
justice should reach equipoise at a proportionate tax."2 47 They
conclude that "the most realistic, but least satisfying explanation for
the appeal of a proportionate tax lies in the concept of
'prominence.' "I24 In other words, the idea of a flat tax is simple and
241. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (West Supp. 1998).
242. See id. § 68.
243. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 774-75,788.

244. See id. at 781.
245. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1910-15 (1987).
246. Id. at 1913.
247. Id. at 1913-14.
248. Id. at 1914.
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obvious. But simplicity is not enough to justify the choice of a flat tax
as a neutral baseline. If the choice of a flat tax as a baseline is not
justified, neither is the choice of any other rate structure. 249 Because
I do not have confidence in the normativity of any rate structure, I do
not contend that progressive rates are unfair to whites. Nevertheless,
the claim that progressivity is anti-white follows from the analysis of
Moran and Whitford 0°
There are two lessons from the racial analysis of progressivity.
First, it provides more evidence that Moran and Whitford's sample
systematically excludes provisions that arguably have anti-white
effects. Second, progressivity provides another example of the
difficulty (or impossibility) of finding neutral baselines from which to
begin the search for discriminatory effects.
2. Nonrandom Choice of Arguments
In addition to nonrandomly selecting Code sections for study,
Moran and Whitford also nonrandomly select from among possible
racial analyses of the provisions they do study. They claim that the
joint return system disproportionately burdens black married
couples32 1 The system creates marriage penalties when husband and
wife have roughly equal incomes, and marriage bonuses when
husband and wife have very unequal incomes. Since the incomes of
black spouses tend to be more nearly equal than the incomes of white
spouses, Moran and Whitford argue the system discriminates against
blacks.
One can argue equally well, however, based on the same law and
the same facts, that joint returns are biased against whites. In Taxing
Women, Edward McCaffery claims that the most significant problem
with joint returns is the stacking effect-the fact that joint returns tax
the income of a secondary earner in a marriage (traditionally the
wife) much more heavily than the income of the primary earner. 2
The stacking effect discourages wives from working outside the
home, in the case of wives who view themselves as secondary earners.
249. Optimal tax theory attempts to determine normative tax rate structures by
determining what rate structure maximizes social welfare under specified value judgments
and empirical assumptions. See id. at 1945-58. The results are too sensitive to debatable
value judgments and empirical assumptions, however, for optimal tax theory to establish
the clear normativity of any particular rate structure.
250. Their assumption of the normativity of flatness on the deduction side implies
flatness is also normative on the income side. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at
774-75,781.
251. See id. at 791-99.
252. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 2, at 11-85.
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McCaffery finds marriage penalties less important than the stacking
effect.23 But if, as Moran and Whitford's evidence suggests, black
married women are generally not secondary earners, then from the
point of view of the stacking effect it is white wives who are
disproportionately harmed by joint returns.
The two arguments are not logically inconsistent. It is possible
for joint returns to harm blacks in one way and to harm white women
in another. The problem, again, is with the selection bias that
permeates Moran and Whitford's analysis. Arguments that the tax
laws are anti-black are explored in depth; equally plausible
arguments pointing the other way are not.
Apart from the issue of selection bias, however, their analysis of
the racial effect of marriage penalties is a good example of the kind
of situation in which their approach may be politically effective. The
joint return system is a bad idea on several grounds, quite apart from
consideration of racial effects;254 mandatory separate returns would
be better tax policy. The demise of a provision that is objectionable
even apart from racial effects may be hastened by their
demonstration that the provision is especially harmful to black
couples.
C. The Problems with the Solutions
1. To Change Behavior or to Accommodate Behavior?
Even conceding, for the sake of argument, that Moran and
Whitford have identified instances of troubling racial skewing in the
Code, some of their solutions are also troubling. For example, they
present evidence that black employees participate in 401(k)
voluntary retirement savings plans at a rate lower than white
employees, even controlling for income.255 The lesson they draw is
that § 401(k) should probably be repealed. z 6 This is more a
surrender than a solution. If the basic problem is that blacks do not
save enough, 57 changing the tax laws to make it harder for blacks to
253. See id. at 19 ("[Ihe marriage penalty is not a major part of the story of taxing
women generally.").
254. I advocate mandatory separate filing for married couples-for reasons unrelated
to racial effects-in Zelenak, supra note 36.
255. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 787.
256. See id. at 790-91. They suggest that other forms of tax-favored voluntary
retirement savings, including individual retirement accounts, also should be repealed. See
id. at 791 n.140.
257. Moran and Whitford seem to agree with this diagnosis. See id. at 802.
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save is not a helpful response. A better approach would be to retain
tax incentives for savings (especially retirement savings), and to use
education and exhortation to increase black response to those
incentives. There appears to be growing interest among blacks in
saving and investment strategies. s Removing tax incentives for
savings, at the very time a movement for increased black savings is
gaining momentum, would be counterproductive.
The general question is whether the tax laws should be changed
to accommodate black consumption patterns and low savings rates,
when those patterns are of doubtful utility. Most of the time,
including the example of § 401(k), Moran and Whitford favor
accommodating current behavior. I disagree. Interestingly, even
Moran and Whitford implicitly reject accommodation in one
important instance. They point out that blacks hold a greater
percentage of their wealth in personal-use cars and trucks than do
whites. s9 They find it ironic that this "one category of assets which
blacks favor in their investment behavior, in comparison with white
investment

behavior,

receives

no

tax

benefits.

'260

The

characterization of buying cars as "investment behavior" is dubious,
and the statement that car ownership confers no tax benefit is
incorrect-the imputed rental income produced by cars is taxexempt. But what if this black-favored behavior really were uniquely
tax-disadvantaged under current law (as Moran and Whitford
suppose)? By the same logic that calls for the repeal of § 401(k), one
would expect Moran and Whitford to call for some sort of new tax
benefit for people whose major "investment" is a personal-use
automobile. Yet they make no such proposal2 61 They do not explain
the absence of a proposal, but a reason suggests itself. They probably
believe it is not a good thing that blacks devote so high a percentage
of their net worth to cars, and that tax laws designed to accommodate
that behavior would do more harm than good. Why they do not
258. The unofficial spokesperson for the movement is Kelvin Boston, host of the PBS
show "The Color of Money," and author of the popular book KELVIN BOSTON, SMART
MONEY MOVES FOR AFRICAN-AMERICANS (1996) (urging blacks to save and invest and
giving practical advice on how to do so). According to a recent national survey, middle
class African-Americans report saving at almost as high a rate as other middle class
Americans (11% versus 12%), but they tend to choose more conservative (and poorerperforming) investment vehicles. See Ariel Mutual Funds Releases First National
Investment Survey of African-Americans, BuSUNSS WIRE, Feb. 12, 1997, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
259. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 11, at 770.
260. Id. at 780.
261. See id. at 779-83 (describing ways in which a "Black Congress" might change the
taxation of wealth, and including no proposals relating to cars and trucks).
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embrace accommodation in this case, while embracing it in most
other cases (including retirement savings), I do not understand.
2. Solutions with Black Victims
After explaining how blacks are disproportionately burdened by
the marriage penalty of joint returns, Moran and Whitford suggest
three possible legislative solutions. 262 The solutions resemble those in
much of the feminist tax policy literature, in that they are described
only in broad outline, and their implications are not carefully
explored. The first solution (which I favor even apart from the racial
critique of joint returns 63) is mandatory separate filing for spouses.
But they go on to propose two alternate solutions, in case a "Black
Congress ' '264 would want to encourage marriage by eliminating
marriage penalties while preserving marriage bonuses.
The first alternate solution would give married taxpayers the
choice of filing two returns as if they were single, or of filing a joint
return, depending on which choice resulted in a lower tax liability.2 65
Solely from a black perspective, would this be desirable? Assuming
no change in tax rate schedules, the result of the proposal would be a
decrease in taxes paid by married couples as a group. Couples
currently suffering a marriage penalty would reduce their taxes by
filing separately, and couples currently enjoying a marriage bonus
would have no change in their taxes. In addition to a drop in total tax
revenues, this would mean single persons would bear a larger portion
of the total tax burden. As Moran and Whitford themselves point
out, single persons are disproportionately black.2 66 The appeal to a
Black Congress of increasing the share of the tax burden imposed on
a group disproportionately black is not readily apparent.
The second alternate solution would give married couples the
same choice as the first, but would extend that choice of filing status
to unmarried couples as well.2 67 In addition to having marriage
bonuses without marriage penalties, the system would have
cohabitation bonuses without penalties.
This proposal would
increase the portion of the total tax burden falling on the "truly
single." Although it is impossible to count the truly single without
262. See id. at 798-99.
263. See Zelenak, supra note 36.
264. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 11, at 758 ("We have invented a metaphor of a
Black Congress that is exclusively oriented to the interests of blacks as a group.").
265. See id. at 798-99.
266. See id. at 797 n.163.

267. See id. at 799.
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knowing exactly how they would be defined for tax purposes, 26 they
are probably disproportionately black (because singles in general are
disproportionately black). We do know that a major component of
the truly single-and a group in especially difficult circumstances-is
single mothers living with children under eighteen. Black women are
hugely overrepresented in this category.2 69 Would a Black Congress
really want to help couples-married and unmarried-at the expense
of single parents?
VI. DOING IT RIGHT-A FEw EXAMPLES

It is possible to practice critical tax analysis without falling into
the traps of one-sidedness and incomplete analysis. The feminist
work of Grace Blumberg, and the more recent work by Patricia A.
Cain and David L. Chambers on the tax treatment of same-sex
couples, are good examples.
A.

GraceBlumberg and Sexism in the Code
In her pioneering work of feminist tax analysis,2 ° Grace
Blumberg is careful to distinguish between intended and accidental
ways in which the tax laws discourage wives from working outside the
home. She criticizes the joint return system for taxing wives' earnings
at high marginal rates, but she is careful to explain that Congress did
not adopt joint returns for the purpose of discouraging married
women from working. She acknowledges the legitimate case for joint
returns: "Aggregation of spousal income ...is based on the
indisputable economic unity of the family. Since resources are
generally pooled by spouses, their ability to pay taxes is best
measured in terms of family rather than individual income.""27
Where she does find evidence of sexist intent, she presents her
case fairly and forcefully. At the time she was writing, the child care
deduction available to a two-earner couple was phased out as their
268. See id. ("We do not know whether there are more black than white couples who
are living together but unmarried and who would enjoy a marriage bonus if they did
marry.").
269. In 1994, 60% of all black families with children under 18 were headed by a single
mother. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1995 tbl.72. The equivalent figure for white family

groups was 21%. See id.
270. See Blumberg, supra note 1. In a recent appreciation of Blumberg's article,
Edward McCaffery describes it as "pathbreaking." Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire,
85 GEO. L.J. 71, 147 (1996). McCaffery and I are both at some pains to avoid the

obvious, yet singularly inappropriate, adjective.
271. Blumberg, supra note 1, at 52.
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adjusted gross income exceeded $6000; Blumberg demonstrates that
the phase-out was motivated by a congressional belief that "a
married mother with a husband capable of support will not or should
not work unless her income is absolutely necessary to provide for
basic family needs." 272
She does not simply note the difference in the motives
underlying the two provisions; she insists on the significance of the
difference: "The [child care deduction] income limitation can
profitably be contrasted with spousal aggregation. Aggregation,
while tending to act as a work deterrent for secondary earners, is
supported by the clearly legitimate legislative goal of taxing each
economic unit according to its ability to pay. '273 This difference
makes a difference in her proposed reforms. She has no patience
with the sexist intent behind the income limitation on the child care
deduction; in addition to calling for its repeal,274 she argues it is
unconstitutional. 75 Because she views joint returns as serving a
legitimate and important purpose, however, she is open to the
possibility of retaining joint returns-as long as their effect on wives'
work decisions is ameliorated by other reforms, such as an earned
income allowance and expanded deductibility of child care
expenses.2 76
Blumberg's is the right way to think about Code provisions with
adverse impact on women, racial minorities, and other disadvantaged
groups. First, ask if the impact was intended by Congress. If it was
not, ask what legitimate purpose the provision serves. Finally, try to
find the best balance between eliminating or ameliorating the
adverse impact, and serving the provision's legitimate purpose.277
The best balance may or may not involve repeal of the offending
provision.
My point is not that Blumberg is necessarily right in accepting
the continued existence of joint returns.278 The point is that her
272 Id. at 71.

273. Id. at 74.
274. See id. at 78-79, 95.
275. See id. at 72-74.

276. See id. at 54, 58. In her very brief conclusion, she calls-without explanation-for
abandonment of joint returns in favor of "individual taxation for all wage earners." Id. at
95. This is inconsistent with the analysis in the rest of the article, which indicates
retention of joint returns would be acceptable if other reforms were adopted.
277. Blumberg's interest in the details of practical reform is also demonstrated by her
careful examination of how the tax laws of several other countries affect working wives,
see id. at 80-88, and by her draft of a proposed revision of the child care deduction, see id.
at 96-98.
278. Actually, I do not consider taxing spouses as an economic unit as important a goal
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careful analytical approach is more likely to result in reasonableand politically feasible-reform proposals than the one-sided
analyses and inadequately considered proposals typical of the
subsequent critical tax literature.
B. Same-Sex Couples and the Tax Laws
More recent examples of careful critical tax analysis can be
found in articles on the tax treatment of same-sex couples. If one
wants to feel aggrieved by the Internal Revenue Code on behalf of
same-sex couples, it is easy to make a list of situations in which
married couples receive better tax treatment than same-sex couples.
Same-sex couples cannot enjoy the marriage bonus that sometimes
comes with joint returns, and they cannot take advantage of the
provisions which exempt transfers between spouses from income tax
and estate and gift tax. 79 In addition, many fringe benefits which
would be tax-free if received by an employee's spouse are taxable if
received by an employee's unmarried partner."
Some
commentators make such a list and complain of the unfairness to
same-sex couples.m 1
But other commentators-most notably Patricia A. Cainn and
n
David L. Chambers
-are too careful to commit a selection bias
error. They note that for tax purposes marriage is a bundle of
benefits and burdens. Married couples cannot recognize a loss on a
transfer of property between them, married couples are subject to
various disadvantageous attribution rules, and, most important, joint
returns often result in marriage penalties.2 4 Chambers goes so far as
as does Blumberg. See Zelenak, supra note 36, at 358-63 (arguing that elimination of
marriage penalties and bonuses is more important than equal tax on equal income
couples).
279. See I.R.C. § 1041 (West Supp. 1998) (no recognition of gain or loss on transfers of
property between spouses); id. § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction); id. § 2523 (income
tax marital deduction).
280. See id. § 132(h)(2) (miscellaneous fringe benefits); id. § 117(d)(2)(B) (qualified
tuition reductions). The most important example is health insurance. Oddly, the spousal
limitation on the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance appears only in the
regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1997).
281. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 12, at 361 (stating that "the generous provisions
offered by the Code [to married couples] ... include the right to file joint returns," with
no mention of the fact that joint returns often result in marriage penalties); Hayes, supra
note 12, at 1600 (noting the possibility of marriage penalties, but asserting without
evidence that "for most taxpayers, the financial benefits of married status far outweigh
the cost of the marriage penalty").
282. See Cain, supra note 12.
283. See Chambers, supra note 12.
284. See Cain, supra note 12, at 98-99; Chambers, supra note 12, at 475.
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to speculate that joint returns might be especially unfavorable to
same-sex couples. Most two-earner couples are disadvantaged by
joint returns, and same-sex couples are likely to have two earners.
Having noted this bundle of burdens and benefits afforded
marriage by the tax laws, Cain and Chambers have different
responses. Chambers suggests that there is residual discrimination
against same-sex couples because, unlike heterosexual couples, they
cannot choose between married and unmarried tax regimes: "[T]he
opportunity for legal marriage, at the very least, provides a choice to
opposite-sex couples whether to marry or not, a choice from which
lesbian and gay couples could benefit for the same sorts of
reasons."' 61 By focusing on the question of choice, Chambers
constructs a reasonable argument that there is a tax bias against
same-sex couples, even if most same-sex couples receive better tax
treatment as unmarried cohabitants than they would as spouses. This
is a thoughtful and sophisticated version of the usually naive
argument that same-sex couples are harmed by not being able to file
joint returns. 7
Cain takes a principled position that same-sex and opposite-sex
couples are similarly situated for tax purposes, and that if joint
returns are appropriate for married heterosexual couples, they are
also appropriate for equally committed same-sex couples-regardless
of whether the effect is to increase or decrease the tax liabilities of
same-sex couples.0 8 She does not, however, argue at length for a
goal that is politically unrealistic (at least in the short term). Instead,
she identifies the most serious tax problems facing same-sex couples,
and proposes more politically feasible solutions tailored to those
problems.
The most serious problem is the possibility that income earned
by one partner, and used to support the other partner, may be taxable
income to both partners. For this problem, she advances a solid
285. See Chambers, supra note 12, at 475.
286. Id. at 476.
287. There is, however, a subtle response to Chambers's argument. Personal morals
or social pressures may make the unmarried cohabitation option illusory for many
married couples, no matter how much less tax they would pay if unmarried. If same-sex
marriage were legally recognized for tax and other purposes, same-sex couples might find
their choice of tax status illusory if personal morality or social pressure forced them to
marry. The point is that choosing to marry has important non-tax consequences that may
deprive the couple of a tax choice; being taxed as married or unmarried is not the
equivalent of check-the-box classification of business organizations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(c) (as amended in 1997).
288. See Cain, supra note 12, at 102, 130-31.
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technical argument that current law can and should be interpreted
not to tax the supported partner.m9 The second problem Cain
addresses is that even if income earned by one partner and used to
support the other partner is not double taxed under current law, it is
taxed at the higher marginal rate of the supporting partner. For this
problem, Cain proposes a narrow legislative solution-either taxing
support payments only to the supported spouse, or allowing the
supporting spouse an increased dependency exemption.2 90 Cain's
focus on solutions rather than on complaints, and her interest in the
politically possible, distinguish her work from much of the critical tax
policy literature.
VII. CONCLUSION

Even if a reader agrees with every specific criticism I have made,
she may still question whether I have established any broader point
about critical approaches to tax policy. Some critical tax analysis is
impressive-including the pioneering work of Grace Ganz Blumberg,
the recent feminist efforts of Anne Alstott and Edward McCaffery, 291
and the recent work on the taxation of same-sex couples by Patricia
Cain and David Chambers. And critical tax analysts certainly have
no monopoly on one-sided analysis or inadequately considered
reform proposals. Is there really anything special about the faults of
the critical tax literature? Although I cannot offer definitive proof, I
believe there is something special-that problems of one-sidedness
and incomplete analysis are more common in the critical tax
literature than in the general academic tax policy literature.
If that is true, why is it true? One reason may be that
participants in the critical tax project do not approach the tax laws in
a detached and disinterested frame of mind. In their introduction to
Taxing America, Brown and Fellows present "those interested in
joining in this project" with "the challenge of... uncovering bias and
discrimination in the tax law." 292 Within the critical tax movement,
there is a reward for examining a tax provision and finding it guilty of
hidden discrimination; there is no reward for discovering a provision
is innocent.
In reading much of the critical tax literature, one comes away
289. See id. at 114-16.
290. See id. at 118-23.
291. I say this despite the fact that McCaffery and Alstott disagree more often than
they agree. See Alstott, supra note 4, at 2033-42 (providing a detailed analysis and
criticism of McCaffery's proposal to reduce marginal tax rates on wives).
292. Brown & Fellows, supra note 13, at 20-21.
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with the impression the authors set out on the sort of search for
hidden discrimination called for by Brown and Fellows. In the case
of Moran and Whitford, they acknowledge as much 93 By contrast, in
reading Blumberg, Chambers, and Cain, one has the impression that
the problems they address came naturally to their attention.
Although Blumberg does not explain how the income tax work
disincentives for wives came to her attention, she comments that
"[a]ny wife contemplating work or actually working will compare her
disposable income (after taxation without exemptions at her
husband's marginal rate) with the additional expenses incurred
'
This suggests the
because of her daily departure from the home."294
work disincentives of the tax system presented themselves to her in
the course of her consideration of the work decisions of married
women, and not that she went looking for sexism in the Code.2 95
With Chambers and Cain, there is even more clearly no search for
hidden discrimination. A same-sex couple could not help but notice
they do not file joint returns like their married friends.
It is probably not a coincidence that the stronger analyses tend
to be in articles where the authors did not set out looking for hidden
discrimination. While it is certainly possible that a search will find
legitimate grievances, the nature of the project creates a great danger
of unfounded complaints and poorly considered reform proposals.
This problem is not unique to critical tax theory296-- other tax
academics also have axes to grind-but it seems especially pervasive
here.
The biggest problem, however, is that almost no one is engaging
critical tax theorists in the scholarly dialogue needed in order to test
their arguments and proposals. 297 Those outside the movement have
293. See Moran & Whitford, supranote 11, at 753-55.
294. Blumberg, supranote 1, at 89.
295. Certainly she did not have to hunt much for the discrimination against working
wives then embodied in the income limitation on the child care deduction; the
discriminatory intent behind the provision is hard to miss. See id. at 70-72. In a sense, it
was easier for Blumberg to make the important distinction between intended and
unintended anti-feminist effects of tax legislation because she was faced with an example
of a clearly intended effect. More recent commentators have seldom had that "luxury."
296. "Scholarship is expected to be original, and defense of the conventional wisdom
provides few opportunities for brilliance. The professor seeking scholarly recognition is
well-advised to steer away from the true but trite, in favor of the false but novel." Daniel
A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 307, 310

(1986).
297. This problem also is not unique to the critical tax literature. "In law, unlike some
other fields, it is rare for a professor to attack a colleague's work in print. Such attacks,
when they occur at all, are likely to be restrained and extremely polite." Id. at 310-11
(footnote omitted).
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simply ignored it, while those within have mostly chosen support at
the expense of discussion and debate. 298 This is understandable, given
the small size and outsider status of the movement.299 What is needed
now is vigorous discussion among those both within and outside the
critical tax movement. Two articles published in 1996-by Nancy
Staudt and Anne Alstott 3 °--are encouraging signs of the beginning
of debate within the movement. I hope this article-by someone
outside the movement but sympathetic to some of its goals-will
expand the dialogue.
Not that long ago, a leading commentator on taxation of the
family could confidently write, "If a married woman, because of a
stereotyped view of marriage, views herself as the marginal worker,
we might bemoan the social conventions that have encouraged that
perspective, but we have no cause for complaint against the tax
system." '01 It is the great accomplishment of the feminist branch of
critical tax analysis that the days of such rarefied formalism are gone
forever. With the growing influence of critical analysis-and with its
potential to affect the development of the tax laws-comes
responsibility. That responsibility is to examine more carefully which
criticisms of current law are legitimate, and to consider more
thoroughly which proposed reforms would have the desired effects.
That should be the next step in the development of a new kind of tax
policy analysis.

298. I develop this point more fully in Lawrence Zelenak, Feminism and "Safe Subjects
Like the Tax Code," 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 323 (1997).

299. Brown and Fellows suggest this when they write that workshops and conferences
"brought together a group of tax scholars in which each of us who previously felt isolated
by the traditional tax analysis that dominated the legal literature and tax conferences now
have found intellectual kinship." Brown & Fellows, supranote 15, at vii-viii.
300. See Staudt, supra note 8, at 1605-14 (arguing that tax reform to benefit
homemakers is a more important feminist issue than the repeal of joint returns); Alstott,
supra note 4 (devoting entire article to consideration of the merits-from a feminist
perspective--of various feminist tax reform proposals).
301. Michael J. McIntyre, Individual Filingin the PersonalIncome Tax: Prolegomena
to FutureDiscussion, 58 N.C. L. REV. 469, 484 (1980). Earlier, McIntyre had co-authored
Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and
Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).

